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This thesis uses past experiences to help develop a theoretical framework for 
maritime special operations forces (SOF) to succeed in the littorals. The theoretical 
framework defines six principles important to special operations in littoral spaces: 
deliberate planning, tailored force, specified mobility, joint support, cover/concealment, 
and innovation. Five historical case studies followed by a vignette show the importance 
of these theoretical principles for planning and executing successful special operations in 
this complex environment. These principles should be considered for incorporation into 
any future SOF doctrine or concepts designed for this environment. 
For more than a decade of deployment in Afghanistan and Iraq, maritime SOF 
focused on land warfare. However, most maritime and amphibious forces are currently 
refocusing their efforts to their core capabilities. General statistics indicate that, because 
of population growth, urbanization, and half the world’s population living no more than 
120 miles from a coast, future conflicts and humanitarian disasters will likely take place 
in the littorals. Littoral operations are vastly different from land-locked or open-water 
operations. Maritime SOF units must prepare for future operations in the littorals. 
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A landing on a foreign coast in the face of hostile troops has always been 
one of the most difficult operations of war. 
—Captain Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart (1895–1970) 
Both history and recent events demonstrate that many conflicts and crises occur in 
the littorals.1 Despite history, little has been done to produce a doctrine specifically 
focused on operations in the littorals. Existing doctrine is primarily focused on five 
traditional domains: land, sea, air, space, and information.2 In the doctrines of many 
nations, a gap exists in accounting for the littorals and their complex interrelationship 
with the other domains. It is increasingly important to strategize for the littorals, since 
some powerful economic and social trends indicate that decisive battles will be fought in 
this complex intersection of multiple domains.  
An extensive literature review has helped identify six viable principles for 
successful littoral special operations, applicable regardless of timing and location of these 
operations. Therefore, this study aims to conduct a theoretical analysis of historical 
special operations to show the importance of viable principles that support the success of 
special operations in the littorals. Thereafter, states with interests in the littorals can take 
the principles developed and analyzed in this research and apply the concepts to future 
doctrine to support littoral special operations. 
A. WHY ARE THE LITTORAL AREAS IMPORTANT? 
This section presents reasons why the littoral areas are expected to be increasingly 
important in the future. 
                                                 
1 Richard Mills, “Littoral Combat Clip,” Foreign Policy, November 1, 2012, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/11/01/littoral-combat-clip/. 




1. For What Future Threat Patterns Must Governments Prepare?— 
A Scenario 
To demonstrate the principles for littoral special operations in action beyond the 
analysis of the historical cases, this study offers a hypothetical scenario vignette that is 
indicative of the present and future situations governments interested in security issues 
within the littoral spaces should be prepared to cope with. 
Since Gadhafi’s fall in 2011, Libya has been caught in a raging civil war. In 2012, 
a new prime minister and parliament were elected; one would expect the country would 
have moved in a democratic direction. However, the election in 2014 caused increasing 
tension as many of the old members of the parliament refused to resign. The 2014 
election resulted in a dual government, and the United Nations (UN) moved in to 
negotiate between the rival parties.3 Currently, there are multiple large factions in Libya 
fighting for power. Some jihadists have pledged their allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) 
and have taken control over the coastal city Sirte.4 The IS of Libya is expanding rapidly 
as Russia and Western powers attack IS in Syria and Iraq.5 
Moving from the present to a possible future, in 2024, after 13 years of civil war, 
the UN attempted to stabilize the country, to no avail, with rival groups dividing the 
country between them, leaving Libya a failed state. After the IS’s defeat in Syria and 
Iraq, the Libyan IS is the only franchise of the group that holds actual ground and is 
expanding its control to include the coastal areas from Sirte to Tripoli and Zuwara. Over 
time, the population of Tripoli has doubled from 2.2 million people in 2016 to 4.4 million 
in 2024.6 
 
                                                 
3 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Libya,” accessed April 19, 2016, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html. 
4 Nick Robins-Early, “What We Know about ISIS in Libya,” Huffington Post, February 19, 2016, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/IS-presence-in-libya_us_56b369e2e4b08069c7a6352f. 
5 Jim Sciutto, Barbara Starr, and Kevin Liptak, “ISIS Fighters in Libya Surge as Group Suffers 
Setbacks in Syria, Iraq,” CNN, February 4, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/04/politics/isis-fighters-
libya-syria-iraq/. 
6 A fictional scenario is presented, starting in this paragraph.  
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Islamic State Libya is popular and has the ability to recruit foreign fighters from 
Europe, Asia, and former Soviet Union countries, which enables it to import cheap 
drones from these areas. The drones provide intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance for their fighting groups. Islamic State Libya are also in the position to 
acquire integrated GPS-controlled mortars rounds, night vision goggles, and guided 
surface-to-air-missiles (SAMs) in their arsenal. Islamic State Libya has developed a very 
specific navy, consisting mainly of small, simple, fast patrol boats and skiffs loaded with 
explosive charges. Their navy units are specifically designed to apply tactics based on 
swarming concepts.7 
Islamic State Libya expands its influence beyond the Libyan borders. The group 
has supported several terrorist attacks on soft European targets, public transport and news 
agencies. In 2024, its most powerful and deadly attack occurred during the finals of the 
Union of European Football Associations soccer championship, between France and 
Britain in Germany. The French and British public demanded actions from their 
governments to avenge the numerous national players and citizens who died in the attack. 
In the fall of 2024, both French and British governments decide to act against IS 
Libya by ordering an operation to capture or kill its leadership. However, they face a 
challenging situation. The terrorists have positioned themselves in a very large and dense 
city along the coast, using the population as a cover and a human shield. The terrorists 
can defend themselves against air attacks with their SAMs and against any approaching 
surface navy with their simple but effective swarming patrol boats. Any conventional, 
large-scale intervention will result in large numbers of casualties among the innocent 
civilian population, and probably the loss of some French and British strategic assets as a 
result of the SAMs and swarming attack boats.8  
                                                 
7 John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, Swarming & the Future of Conflict (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 2000), vii. 
8 This thesis will return to this scenario at the conclusion of the historical case studies and analysis. 
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2. Why Should Military Leadership Focus on Littoral Spaces? 
In The Art of War, famous military theorist Baron A.H. de Jomini lists all the 
large maritime expeditionary operations from 500 BC up to the early 1800s.9 He points 
out how navies have always moved armies to the battlefields, and the littorals have 
always been the gateway. Is today any different? There have always been smaller 
specialized units, some of which precede modern special operations forces (SOF), 
consistently supported amphibious landings by scouting for good landing points. 
Underwater demolition teams cleared the beaches of obstacles on D-Day at Normandy 
and the Allied Jedburgh teams prepared the environment beyond the beaches.10  
There are three main reasons why the littorals will become increasingly important 
and why focusing on the littorals is a right decision from a strategic perspective. The first 
reason is based on population trends. The second reason is the complexity of the littorals 
and the third reason is decades of limited attention on the littorals.  
Four worldwide trends increase the likelihood of future conflicts in the littorals. 
First, the world’s population is growing at an increasing rate.11 In 1900, the population 
was just 1.5 billion, and over the next 100 years, the world population doubled to 6 
billion.12 The UN predicts that by 2050 the world population will reach 9.6 billion, and 
by 2100 there will be 10.9 billion people in the world.13 
The second trend shows that the growth in human population is not equally 
distributed across the world. More growth is expected to take place in the U.S., India, 
Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and the least developed countries in Africa.14 Third, 
                                                 
9 A.H. de Jomini, The Art of War (London: Greenhill Books, 1996), 361–90. 
10 Jedburgh teams consisted of three men. Their main mission in WWII was to link the French 
resistance to arriving  conventional forces, just before major combat operations would take place. 
“Jedburgh,” OSS, Office of Strategic Services, accessed April 7, 2016, 
http://www.soc.mil/OSS/jedburghs.html. 
11 United Nations Bureau of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2012 
Revision, Vol. 1 (New York: United Nations, 2013), xiv. 
12 David Kilcullen, The Australian Army in the Urban, Networked Littoral, Army Research Paper No. 
2 (Sydney: Commonwealth of Australia, 2014), 8. 
13 United Nations Bureau of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects, xiv. 
14 Ibid. 
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the growth of human population is becoming more concentrated around cities, and the 
population is moving away from rural areas.  
Figure 1 demonstrates this trend. The graph illustrates that, in 2010, the global 
population was more urban than rural for the first time in history and that this trend will 
increase in the future. Figure 1 illustrates that, in 2030, “nearly two-thirds of the world’s 
population will be living in urban areas.”15 
 
Figure 1.  Urban and Rural Population of the World, 1950–203016 
The fourth trend is urbanization in the littorals. It is predicted that the future 
growth of the world population will take place in the cities of Asia, Africa, and the U.S.17 
In the past, many large cities were positioned close to rivers, seaports, deltas, or lakes for 
economic reasons. These coastal cities have attracted large numbers of people, since there 
are more facilities (health care, schools, houses, electricity, and so on) and job 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 1. 
16 United Nations Bureau of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects. 
17 Ibid., 1. 
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opportunities. By 2012, nearly 75 percent of large and mid-sized cities were littoral.18 
Urbanization and movement toward the littoral zone resulted in half of the world’s 
population living no more than 120 miles from the coast.19 Conflicts tend to originate or 
concentrate where people live, hence, the increased risk of conflict in the urban littorals. 
In particular, large cities within a weakened state provide conditions for terrorists, 
insurgents, and organized crime to flourish.20 
The second reason, the littoral environment is unique and complex as the other 
five domains intersect there.21 Most military doctrines are based on at least one of the 
five different domains with concepts used to increase the chances of operational success. 
In some cases, the domains overlap or influence other domains. The intersection of 
domains adds complexity and challenges when developing sound operational concepts. 
Because, as the environment becomes more complex, so also does the enemy threat. 
David Kilcullen provides an interesting view on the complexity of the littorals with nine 
littoral subdomains that he describes as all interrelated or influencing each other in 
various ways, creating complex and sensitive relationships among themselves (see Figure 
2).22 Where the domains intersect also the authority of each service or agency intersect. 
Responsibilities become uncertain and it increases the need for coordination. This 
increases the difficulty of conducting operations, developing concept or doctrine for the 
littorals. 
                                                 
18 Kilcullen, Australian Army, 13.  
19 Maritieme Visie [Maritime vision], De Koninklijke marine in 2013 [Royal Netherlands Navy in 
2013], 4. 
20 Magnus Nordenman, The Naval Alliance: Preparing NATO for a Maritime Century (Washington, 
DC: Atlantic Council, June 2015), 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/NATOMaritime_finalPDF.pdf. 
21 Five traditional domains: land, sea, air, space and information. See Benedict, “Information 
Operations.”  
22 Kilcullen, Australian Army, 25–26. 
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Figure 2.  Nine Subdomains in the Littoral Domain23 
The third and final reason to focus on and strategize about the littorals is the 
decades of limited attention to the environment. For the last 15 years, the United States 
and its allied and coalition forces have fought primarily within the land domain during 
the lengthy campaigns in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Before that the focus was on 
peacekeeping in former Yugoslavia, Africa and Asia. Special Operations Forces and 
those that specialize in maritime special operations have also been deeply embroiled in 
these land-based fights, so much so that these forces have lost their ability to perform in 
the maritime domain. With the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan decreasing in size and 
scope, new maritime threats such as Somali piracy have given maritime SOF an 
opportunity to concentrate on their core business in the maritime and littoral domains.24 
Maritime SOF need to regain their specific expertise on how to operate in the littorals.  
                                                 
23 Kilcullen, Australian Army, 26. 
24 Dan Lamothe, “Marine Corps Realigns Its Special Operations, Sends Elite Troops to Middle East,” 




3. What Are Littoral Areas? 
There are two main categories for defining the littorals. The first category is the 
civilian geographically-based definition, which varies between tide-based distances and 
continental shelf–based definitions.25 The second category is the various military 
definitions, which often are weapon range– or influenced-based. The United States, 
British, and Norwegian militaries have similarities in their definitions. British doctrine is, 
however, more limiting than U.S. or Norwegian doctrine. British doctrine focuses 
primarily on the ability to influence these areas from the sea. British military doctrine 
defines the littorals thus: 
The littoral, a vast, highly complex, and immensely diverse area, 
comprises [exclusive economic zones], territorial seas, and land territory. 
… A substantial proportion of the world’s economic and political activity 
is being conducted in a narrow strip of land and sea on average no wider 
than 300 miles. This narrow band, referred to as the littoral and is defined 
as those land areas (and their adjacent sea and associated air space) that 
are predominantly susceptible to engagement and influence from the 
sea.26 
U.S. and Norwegian definitions also include the ability to influence the sea from 
land. The U.S. definition is:  
The littorals comprise two segments of battle space: 1. Seaward: the area 
from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support 
operations ashore. 2. Landward: the area inland from the shore that can be 
supported and defended directly from the sea.27 
The Norwegian definition of littorals translates almost identically to the U.S. 
definition.28 Though the definitions may vary, each nation’s military ability to influence 
these areas is vastly different. Large militaries with a high level of military technology 
                                                 
25 Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. “Littoral zone,” accessed April 19, 2016, 
http://www.britannica.com/science/littoral-zone. Civilian definitions explain the littorals as the highest sea 
level to the lowest tide and the area between. 
26 Ministry of Defence, British Maritime Doctrine, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-10 (Shrivenham, 
England: The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, August 2011). 
27 U.S. Department of Defense, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations, Joint 
Publication 3-32 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Joint Doctrine Division, August 7, 2013). 
28 Forsvarsstaben [Norwegian Defense Staff], Forsvarets fellesoperative doctrine [Norwegian joint 
doctrine] (Oslo: Forsvarets høgskole [Norwegian Defense Staff College], 2014), 223.  
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can expand their influence in the littoral zone by extending their operational reach both 
inland and into the open ocean.29 For example, Chinese land-based surface missile 
systems are capable of stretching the littoral zone because of the system’s advanced 
technology. Figure 3, the map of the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific, 
shows the range of one class of Chinese missile systems. Other smaller nations with less 
technology, however, may think of the littoral zone as something very different.  
 
Figure 3.  Maximum Weapon Range Template for the Chinese Dong Feng 21 
Anti-ship Ballistic Missile30 
 
                                                 
29 NATO does not have its own definition for the littorals.  
30 David Kilcullen, “The Conduct of Future Operations in the Urban Littoral, and Its Implications for 
NATO,” paper presented at the Final Coordination Conference for the Urbanisation Experiment, Sofia, 
Bulgaria, March 2015, 12. 
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Kilcullen defines the littorals in “The Conduct of Future Operations in the Urban 
Littorals, and Its Implications for NATO” as: 
In a military sense, a littoral zone is the portion of land space that can be 
engaged using sea-based weapon systems, plus the adjacent sea space 
(surface and subsurface) that can be engaged using land-based weapon 
systems, and the surrounding airspace and cyberspace. In other words, a 
littoral zone is the sea space you can hit from the land, the land you can hit 
from the sea, and the airspace and cyberspace above both. Obviously 
enough, the area you can hit depends on the weapon you’re using, so as 
weapons get more capable and longer in range, the size of the area defined 
as “littoral” grows accordingly. Also, obviously, areas that are littoral for a 
military with long-range weapons and strike platforms may not be so for 
another military with shorter-range systems. However large or small 
littoral zones may be, the interaction among mutually influencing sea, 
land, air, and cyber spaces makes such zones highly complex systems that 
are vastly more dynamic than the sum of their parts.31 
Kilcullen also argues that, in military scenarios, a littoral definition should always be 
capability-based more than territorial- or zone-based.32 His definition is a more detailed 
version of the U.S. and Norwegian definitions.33 
4. What Forces Are Best Suited for Operations in the Littorals? 
Many types of forces can operate in the littorals. However, taking into account the 
complex nature of the littorals, including the subdomains, and the dense population in 
megacities, not every force is equally suited to operate there. A selected force needs to be 
able to operate fluidly against opponents of an irregular nature and to respond to a crisis 
or conflict on short notice.34 Additionally, some governments will want to minimize 
collateral damage during any military operation, so the force needs to be able to operate 
surgically and preferably with a small footprint.  
                                                 
31 Kilcullen, “The Conduct of Future Operations,” 10. 
32 Ibid., 1. 
33 For this thesis, the U.S. and Norwegian definitions of littorals are used as a framework to have a 
common understanding of what is discussed. However, the reader should bear in mind that there are 
variations of the understanding of what the littoral areas are. 
34 Brian B. Ettrich, “The Principles of War: Are They Still Applicable?” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2005). 
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Given these considerations, SOF is one of the most suitable forces to operate in 
the littoral environment. In general, SOF units are designed to execute complex missions 
on short notice since they are specially equipped and trained for these tasks. They are 
organized in relatively small units and have the capability to strike with high accuracy, 
especially in conjunction with airpower.35 
A broad variation of definitions of SOF exists; one informal definition is “that 
they are what conventional forces are not.”36 Others may define Special Forces as elite 
versions of conventional forces with better training and equipment, but that would 
include units like the UK’s Para or the Norway’s Coastal Rangers.37 While these are elite 
forces in comparison to conventional ones, with special equipment and training, they do 
not conduct special operations across the spectrum, and thus they are not defined as 
SOF.38 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defines special operations as:  
military activities conducted by specially designated, organized, trained 
and equipped forces using operational techniques and modes of 
employment not standard to conventional forces. These activities are 
conducted across the full range of military operations (peace, crisis and 
conflict) independently or in co-ordination with operations of conventional 
forces to achieve military, political, economic and psychological 
objectives or a combination thereof. Political-military considerations may 
require covert or discreet techniques and the acceptance of a degree of 
physical and political risk, not associated with conventional operations.39 
Most NATO countries follow this definition and categorize special operations into 
three main types of operations: Military Assistance (MA), Direct Action (DA), and 
                                                 
35 Brent Bahl, “Special Operations, Intelligence, and Airpower: A Lethal Triumvirate,” War on the 
Rocks, September 25, 2015, http://warontherocks.com/2015/09/special-operations-intelligence-and-
airpower-a-lethal-triumvirate/. 
36 Christopher Lamb, “Perspectives on Emerging SOF Roles and Missions,” Special Warfare 8, no. 3 
(July 1995): 3. 
37 Tom Robertsen, “Transforming Norwegian Special Operation Forces” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2006), 14. Robertsen cites Lars M. Hovtun, “Spesialister Får NATO- Trening” 
[Specialists get NATO training], Norwegian Defense, accessed October 11, 2005, 
http://www.mil.no/haren/start/article.jhtml?articleID=108557. 
38 Robertsen, “Transforming Norwegian Special Operation Forces.” 
39 NATO. Allied Joint Doctrine. AJP-01(D). Brussels: NATO, 2010. L-12. 
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Special Reconnaissance (SR).40 U.S. SOF has its own definition and divides these along 
mission types with nine different core activities.41 Most of these activities can occur in 
the littorals.  
Retired Admiral William McRaven defines special operations as “conducted by 
forces specially trained, equipped, and supported for a specific target whose destruction, 
elimination, or rescue is a political or military imperative.”42 He has received some 
criticism that his theory is solely focused on the conduct of direct action and does not 
offer an explanation for any of the other nine mission types, though he argues his theory 
of special operations is applicable across the SOF spectrum.43 
Former U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst Ross Kelly defines SOF 
differently: “The thrust of conventional force training … is the achievement of consistent 
performance of routine tasks to the highest attainable standard. By contrast, the emphasis 
in special operations is on directing individual skills to the accomplishment of functions 
unique to a given mission, generally a high-risk one. Improvisation and independent 
thinking are essential.”44 This definition captures how SOF covers a wide spectrum of 
training and operations, while conventional forces conduct specific training in order to 
achieve the highest possible standard in their specific task.45 The wide spectrum of 
capabilities enables SOF to excel across the littoral sub-domains and transfer successfully 
between them.  
                                                 
40 Forsvarsstaben [Norwegian Defense Staff], Forsvarets fellesoperative doctrine [Norwegian joint 
doctrine], 120. 
41 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, Joint Doctrine 3-05 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 
July 16, 2014), II-3. U.S. SOF Core Activities: direct action, special reconnaissance, countering weapons of 
mass destruction, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, security force 
assistance, hostage rescue and recovery, counterinsurgency, foreign humanitarian assistance, military 
information support operations, and civil affairs operations. 
42 William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare; Theory and Practice 
(Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995), 3. 
43 McRaven, Spec Ops, 3. 
44 Ross S. Kelly, Special Operations and National Purpose (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), 
xvii. 
45 For this thesis, the NATO definition will be used. But the reader should keep in mind that each 
country might have its own definition of special operations and what SOF units are. 
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Some countries have several SOF units usually divided into maritime, land, and 
air units. It can be hard to distinguish the missions and tasks from within each unit 
because they often overlap, as many try to exercise an expertise in various forms of 
infiltration such as via air and water means. These capabilities then, in turn, naturally 
intersect in the littoral domain. In general, the main focus of maritime SOF units is on 
maritime and littoral areas while land SOF units focus on land operations. However, 
since the littoral domain is influenced from sea, air, and land, it is natural to expect land 
SOF to also operate in this domain.46 
Specifically regarding the littorals, typical maritime SOF units are capable of 
conducting operations in all domains. Highly equipped, specially trained, SOF units have 
operational experience in using insertion and extraction methods for air, land, and the 
maritime domain, all in order to actually conduct operations within both land and 
maritime domains. More importantly, maritime SOF is able to cross the borders of the 
three domains. Their capability is of high value in the littorals, since it enables maritime 
SOF to maneuver and operate with specified mobility assets in each sub-domain of the 
littorals. Figure 4 illustrates the domain crossing capabilities of maritime SOF. Most 
maritime SOF is also likely rooted in their respective navy or Marine Corps services, 
which help minimize the complexity of conventional support. The strong relationship 
between these services enables the SOF.  
                                                 
46 Large-scale special operations in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq have forced 
countries to use maritime as well as land units in land-locked countries. Conversely, in this thesis, the focus 
is on maritime SOF, but large littoral operations may result in land SOF units joining the effort. 
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Figure 4.  The Capability of Maritime SOF to Cross the Borders of the 
Three Domains 
5. How Will Maritime SOF Operate in the Littorals? 
Every country varies in its approach to operating in the littorals. Some countries 
have detailed doctrines for all five domains, but not specifically for the littorals. For 
example, the U.S. Marine Corps has developed a doctrine for amphibious operations,47 
whereas Norway48 and neighboring Sweden have littoral concepts that focus only on 
conventional warfare. Even though SOF has the ability to operate across each of the 
domains in littoral spaces, this study has not identified any concepts or doctrine specific 
to special operations in the littorals.  
 
                                                 
47 U.S. Department of Defense, Amphibious Operations, Joint Publication 3-02 (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, July 18, 2014), 
http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/JointDoctrineAmphibiousOperations.pdf. 
48 The Norwegian Maritime Doctrine has a concept for amphibious warfare. Forsvarets 
overkommando [Norwegian Defense Command], Norsk Doktrine for Maritime Operasjoner [Norwegian 
doctrine for maritime operations] (Oslo: AS Gutenbergs Eftf., 2002), 87. 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Now that maritime SOF has time to shift their focus to the littorals, specific 
concepts and doctrine are required to ensure that maritime SOF is well-prepared to 
operate in the littoral domain. The refocus of maritime SOF units to littoral operations is 
vital, considering the four megatrends and the likelihood of the littorals as a future 
operational environment. 
In support of this operational shift to the littorals, this research asks the question: 
How can past operational experiences from the littoral areas help lead to the development 
of for future littoral special operations? To answer this question, this study develops a 
theoretical framework for littoral special operations that is based on six viable principles 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
It is not big armies that win battles; it is the good ones. 
—Maurice de Saxe, Mes Reveries, 1732 
In Chapter I, the thesis discussed the definition and special needs of preparing for 
operations in littoral areas, with a keen eye to an increasingly complex world. 
Strategizing about warfare, however, is nothing new. This chapter discusses principles of 
war developed by important military thinkers from Sun Tzu 500 BC until Ferdinand Foch 
in 1918. A review of modern principles of war and those distinctive to SOF follow. From 
this review, key principles are then derived specific to the needs of littoral special 
operations to help better prepare SOF prepare for future employment.  
A. PRINCIPLES OF WAR, LARGE MILITARIES, AND SOF 
Thinking hard about how to best employ military forces is not a new practice. In 
500 BC, Chinese general Sun Tzu was the first military thinker to develop principles of 
war. In The Art of War, Tzu outlines several guiding principles for warfare. However, 
these principles of war are not how they are known today.49 Mark McNeilly reorganized 
and distilled Sun Tzu’s works into six principles that are comparable to modern 
principles of war.50 
1. Win All without Fighting: Prioritize Threats and Determine Strategic 
Focus.  
2. Avoid Strength, Attack Weakness: Develop Attacks against the Enemy’s 
Weakness. 
3. Deception and Foreknowledge: Wargame and Plan for Surprise. 
4. Shaping the Enemy: Integrate Best Attacks to Defeat the Enemy. 
                                                 
49.P.K. Mallick, Principles of War: Time for Relook, Manekshaw Paper No. 12 (New Delhi: Centre for 
Land Warfare Studies), 
http://www.claws.in/images/publication_pdf/1249965562Mankshaw%20Paper%2012.pdf. 
50 Mark R. McNeilly Sun Tzu and the Art of Modern Warfare, updated edition (London: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 206–7; Seiha, “The Six Principles from Sun Tzu and The Art of Modern Warfare,” Sun Tzu, Sun Zi 
Strategy (blog), accessed May 20, 2016. http://suntzuartstrategy.blogspot.com/2011/09/six-principles-from-
sun-tzu-and-art-of.html. 
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5. Speed and Preparation: Ready Attacks and Release Them. 
6. Leadership: Reinforce Success, Starve Failure.51 
Some of the principles that Sun Tzu and McNeilly mention support current 
concepts. Avoiding strength and attacking strength is a form of modern maneuver 
warfare. Wargaming and preparation are extremely useful in the littoral operations 
domain due to the complex nature of these operations and small margins for errors. 
Around 300 BC, Indian philosopher and leader Kautilya (also called Chanakya) 
developed Arthashastra, a book on governance, which included military strategy. He 
identified important principles for planning a military campaign: 
1. Power in terms of strength of fighting forces, enthusiasm, and energy. 
2. Place of operation, type of terrain, and selection of ground of own 
choosing. 
3. Time of military engagement. 
4. Season for marching towards the battleground. 
5. When to mobilize different types of forces. 
6. Possibility of revolts and rebellions in the rear. 
7. Likely losses, expenses, and gains. 
8. Likely dangers.52 
Kautilya considered terrain a principle with powerful influence on strategy. Especially in 
the littorals, terrain can play a key role, in particular when forces are crossing different 
kinds of terrain, or in modern terms, domains. He also mentions the use of different types 
of forces, understanding that there is no standard solution or formula when it comes to the 
type of configuration or force structures. This consideration is important when operating 
in the multi-domain area of the littorals. 
In 1512, Machiavelli published The Art of War, focused on discipline in the 
military with principles that focused on “the importance of morale, security, surprise, 
                                                 
51 McNeilly, Sun Tzu and the Art of Modern Warfare, 206–7. 
52 Mallick, Principles of War, 3. 
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discipline, need for reserves, know yourself and know your enemy, use of terrain, 
logistics, intelligence and objective.”53. Machiavelli, like Kautilya, focused on the terrain 
principle. He also focused on surprise and security, which also are very important for 
littoral special operations.  
Then, 200 years later, in 1757, Maurice de Saxe published his theory in Reveries 
where he emphasized the “need of administration, logistics, morale, deception, initiative, 
leadership and discipline.”54 Inspired by de Saxe, Frederick the Great also had a keen 
interest in preparations to drive operations with maxims for success in military 
operations: “logistics, maneuver, security, cultural awareness, morale, initiative and 
leadership.”55 Here again, concepts related to maneuver and securing the movement of 
forces are both considered vital to success. Initiative, deception, and security are also 
important principles for littoral operations.  
Napoleon never wrote down his own principles of war, but he did see the 
importance of them. He said, “The principles of war are those which have guided the 
great leaders whose achievements have been handed down to us by history.”56 Both 
Clausewitz and Jomini based their writings on their experiences in fighting alongside or 
against Napoleon. Clausewitz’s first book Principles of War, published in 1812, was one 
of the first times the phrase principles of war was used by one of the great military 
thinkers. He divided his principles into “general principles for defense, general principles 
for offense, principles governing the use of troops and principles for the use of terrain.”57 
These four main principles had many detailed principles to explain the execution in 
detail. Clausewitz listed several rules under each general principle, which are relevant for 
littoral operations. He emphasized the importance of cover, planning, surprise, and taking 
                                                 
53 Mallick, Principles of War, 3. 
54 Ibid., 4. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ferdinand Foch, The Principles of War, trans. J. de Morinni (New York: The H.K. Fly Company 
Publishers, 1918), 13. 
57 Carl von Clausewitz, Principles of War, trans. and ed. Hans W. Gatzke (Harrisburg, PA: The 
Military Service Publishing Company, 1942). 
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advantage of the terrain. These are also very important for littoral operations. 
Clausewitz’s theory was later developed and refined in On War, published in 1832.  
Jomini also created fundamental principles of war in his book The Art of War.58 
Jomini’s principles were conceptual and designed to guide military commanders and 
staffs in planning and conducting military operations. Jomini later wrote a summary of 
his book with four main principles:  
1. How men should be directed at decisive points against enemy lines of 
communication while protecting your own. 
2. Maneuver with strength against enemy weakness. 
3. Throw the mass of force onto the enemy’s decisive point. 
4. Mass force so it is not only used against the decisive point, but at the 
proper time with the proper amount of force.59 
His last principle is especially useful for special operations in the littorals since he 
understands the importance of a certain amount, or structured, force that is used correctly 
in time and place. SOF is best used for these kinds of missions, especially in the littorals.  
Marshal Ferdinand Foch, commander of Allied Armies during World War I, also 
developed his own principles of war in 1918 and published them in The Principles of 
War. His principles were: “principle of economy of power, principle of freedom of 
action, principle of free disposal of power and principle of protection etc.”60 These 
principles are still important. In littoral spaces, freedom of action is a result of the ability 
to maneuver between the domains. In some cases, there is very limited maneuverability 
in the littorals. The principle of protection is also vital; it includes cover and concealment 
of the force and operational security.  
Most of today’s modern militaries have principles of war inspired by the military 
theorists mentioned, especially Clausewitz and Jomini’s theories and principles. They are 
often used as list of considerations applicable to all types of operations regardless of the 
                                                 
58 Jomini, Art of War, 66–71. 
59 Mallick, Principles of War, 4–5. 
60 Foch, Principles of War, 13. 
 21 
domain and precision required to execute. Today, the British Defense Doctrine lists ten 
guiding principles that are meant for commanders and staffs to be used in planning and 
operations in war.61 The Russian military uses the principles of war as a theoretical 
framework for preparing and conducting operations across all domains.62 The U.S. 
Armed Forces have nine principles of war (see Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5.  Principles of War: Great Britain, United States, and Russia63 
 
                                                 
61 Ministry of Defence, UK Defence Doctrine, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, 4th ed. (Swindon, 
England: Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre, 2011), 
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/FDB67DF9-5835-47FD-897D-
CA82C17EC7A5/0/20111130jdp001_bdd_Ed4.pdf  
62 David Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle (London: Frank Cass, 
1991), 7–8, 
https://books.google.com/books?id=RWmD2iOgpFAC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false. 
63 Ministry of Defence, UK Defence Doctrine; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint 
Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 11, 2011), I2, A-1–A-4; 
Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art, 7–8. 
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Though the modern principles of war adopted by the modern dominant military 
powers are all focused on a strategic level and on large-scale conventional war, several of 
them are directly applicable to littoral special operations because they are each important 
for consideration when operating across domains. In regards to conventional amphibious 
operations, the United States considers flexibility of the amphibious force to be 
important, as well as planning and rehearsals.64 A good doctrinal example is the Joint 
Shipboard Helicopter and Tiltrotor Aircraft Operations publication of the United 
States.65 The helicopter or tiltrotor is an asset in the maritime domain that can easily 
transport troops across several domains. The publication emphasizes planning and 
integration as important factors in operating in the maritime domain and in the littorals 
and to successfully cross domains.66 NATO considers the integration of land, air, and 
maritime forces as one of the main characteristics of an amphibious operation.67 
From the perspective of special operations theory, the same thread of importance 
can also be seen between principles at the tactical level. According to McRaven’s Theory 
of Special Operations, the principles of surprise, security, and repetition are all features 
of tactical operations that are especially critical to littoral special operations, because they 
embody the vulnerability of moving across domains (see Figure 6). He also emphasizes 
the necessity to be well-rehearsed and prepared prior to mission execution. These 
principles go hand-in-hand with the fundamental guidance for small unit dismounted 
patrolling in denied areas outlined in the U.S. Army’s Ranger Handbook, where the 
principles of “Planning, Reconnaissance, Security, Control and Common Sense” are 
foundational to all operations.68 Since these principles are key to supporting a small 
                                                 
64 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Amphibious Operations, Joint Publication 3-02 (Washington, DC: 
CJCS, July 18, 2014), xii–xvi. 
65 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Shipboard Helicopter and Tiltrotor Aircraft Operations, Joint 
Publication 3-04 (Washington, DC: CJCS, December 6, 2012), 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_04.pdf. 
66 Ibid., viii.  
67 ATP-(B), Volume 1, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, July 2004, 1-3. 
68 United States Army, Ranger Handbook, SH 21-76 (Fort Benning, GA: United States Army Infantry 
School, February 2011), http://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/rtb/4thrtb/content/PDF/Handbook.pdf.  
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vulnerable unit moving in denied territory, namely in the land domain, they naturally 
transfer well to operations across domains that also have small and vulnerable elements. 
 
Figure 6.  McRaven’s Principles of Special Operations69 
B. DEFINITIONS OF DOCTRINE, PRINCIPLES, AND CONCEPTS  
Doctrine, concepts, and principles of war are interconnected. Each of them plays 
an important role in preparing militaries to conduct war. In support of littoral special 
operations, this chapter defines six principles specific to the challenges of moving and 
operating in this unique intersection of the physical domains of military operations. 
Drawing on a number of theoretical traditions and experiences, these principles are 
developed to prepare SOF for future challenges in the littorals.  
Carl von Clausewitz defined doctrine as “a guide to anyone who wants to learn 
about war from books: it will light their way, ease their progress, train their judgment and 
help them to avoid pitfalls. Doctrine is meant to educate the minds of future 
                                                 
69 McRaven, Spec Ops, 11. 
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commanders ... not to accompany them to the battlefields.”70 Ultimately, doctrine is a set 
of guiding principles for militaries in achieving national objectives, but they do require 
interpretation to make them useful. According to David M. Glantz, “The Soviets [Russia] 
define military doctrine as ‘a nation’s officially accepted system of scientifically founded 
views on the nature of modern wars and the use of the armed forces in them, and also on 
the requirements arising from these views regarding the country and its armed forces 
being ready for war.’”71 The RAND Corporation defines doctrine as “the fundamental set 
of principles that guides military forces as they pursue national security objectives. … 
These principles … can range from the policies and procedures put in place by a 
particular military branch to the tactics and techniques taught to new members during 
training.”72 
U.S. joint doctrine definitions go one step further by including the importance of 
coordination of actions and contain terms that also include tactics, techniques, and 
procedures of how to conduct operations. Military doctrine provides not only concrete 
principles, but also more abstract concepts such as irregular warfare (IW), air power, 
nuclear warfare, and maneuver warfare.  
Military concepts provide descriptions of different methods or schemes to employ 
specific capabilities for the purpose of predetermined objectives or military aims. In the 
context of ways, means, and ends, concepts are regarded as the ways, while means are the 
capabilities, and ends are the objective of the specific operation.73 Doctrine contains both 
common principles for conducting military operations and military concepts at different 
levels.  
                                                 
70 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans.Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), 141. 
71 Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art, 3. 
72 “Military Doctrine,” RAND Corporation, accessed April 7, 2016, 
http://www.rand.org/topics/military-doctrine.html. 
73 John F. Schmitt, “A Practical Guide for Developing and Writing Military Concepts,” draft, accessed 
January 6, 2016, www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awxgate/writing/dart_paper_writing_mil _concepts.pdf. 
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C. PRINCIPLES OF LITTORAL SPECIAL OPERATIONS  
To develop principles for littoral special operations, the researchers first 
reconsidered the puzzle of what makes special operations in the littorals so challenging. 
Since operations in littoral spaces require movement through and then transfer across at 
least two of the physical domains associated with military operations (air, land, sea 
surface, and subsurface), the researchers determined which principles of the classical 
military theorists, the current dominant military institutions, and those from the study of 
special operations are most applicable to developing these principles. Specifically, what 
are the most important considerations for commanders, planners, and operators in 
preparation for moving and conducting actions of the objective across multiple domains? 
In Figure 7, the principles of many military theorists are depicted in the top section of the 
upper triangle with the principles of the three dominant military doctrines since the end of 
World War II. In the bottom section of the top triangle, prominent SOF principles 
highlight the importance of the more general concepts to the specifics of special 
operations. Principles germane to littoral special operations are marked in red and italics.  
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Figure 7.  Comparison and Analysis of Principles 
The littorals are a challenging environment in which to fight. Special forces often 
face unpredictable waters with quick changing and strong currents and also shallow 
waters, which limit maneuverability. The maritime environment can be deadly by itself, 
especially subsurface. Operating in the littorals means that forces often have to cross 
domains, which requires scarce assets, making resupply or reinforcements in support of 
the mission very difficult or impossible. The following principles were identified, based 
on the literature review, as necessary to overcome the challenges that the littorals present: 
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1. Deliberate planning 
2. Tailored force 
3. Specified mobility 
4. Joint support 
5. Cover and concealment 
6. Innovation74 
 
1. Deliberate Planning 
When a unit transfers between domains, the operational complexity increases and 
in turn, the vulnerability of the force increases. The transfer of the force involves 
avoiding or engaging an enemy already established and prepared in one or all the 
domains. Detailed planning, preparations, and rehearsals help minimize the risk for a 
small force to maintain its ability to retain freedom of movement and act offensively 
upon reaching its objective area. Clausewitz emphasized the importance of planning 
when he said, “Use all possible means of preparation.”75 Many of the other theorists 
support that: “Machiavelli understood the need for comprehensive calculation and 
thorough planning prior to battle.”76 Sun Tzu shared this view: “Machiavelli and Sun Tzu 
prescribed many of the same approaches to warfare. They both believed in thorough 
planning, prior calculations, and a swift execution.”77 Both McRaven and the Ranger 
handbook also focus on planning, preparation, and rehearsals prior to missions.78 
                                                 
74 There may be other principles that are important, but these are the ones that stood out in the 
literature review and study. These principles may be important for conventional operations in the littorals 
or for special operations outside the littorals, but that is outside the scope of this thesis to prove. 
75 Clausewitz, Principles of War. 
76 Lucas Baur, “Machiavelli and Sun Tzu: Comparisons on Their Art of War,” Liberty and Security 
(blog), May 21, 2014, https://libertyandsecurity.wordpress.com/2014/05/21/machiavelli-and-sun-tzu-
comparisons-on-their-art-of-war/; Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince and the Art of War, ed. Oliver Francis 
(London: Collector’s Library, 2004). 258. 
77 Baur, “Machiavelli and Sun Tzu.” 
78 United States Army, Ranger Handbook, 7-1; McRaven, Spec Ops, 8–15. 
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Special operations require incredibly detailed planning. These operations usually 
have high stakes, and, often, a small force challenges a larger force. The smaller force has 
the disadvantage of less firepower and being in an offensive role against a fortified 
enemy.79 Especially in the complex littorals, where minor mistakes or mishaps have large 
consequences, deliberate planning stands out as a key principle for success.  
Deliberate planning refers to detailed preparations with all units involved, 
equipment testing, and rehearsals. There are many examples of these types of operations, 
the small submarine attack on the Tirpitz in Norway during World War II (WWII), stands 
out as an excellent example of how Royal Navy planned and rehearsed for nearly two 
years to be successful.80 Operation Eagle Claw, the hostage rescue attempt in Iran by the 
U.S. Delta Force, is the ultimate example of the opposite, where, although the plans 
where detailed, the team never conducted proper rock drills and rehearsals in a similar 
environment. Their preparations were flawed, and the result was a disaster for the newly 
established counterterrorism (CT) unit. 81 
Deliberate planning can be described as very detailed and thorough preparations, 
which often include developing new methods and rehearsing these to succeed with the 
specific operation. These operations are often joint and could include conventional forces 
providing enablers, force protection, and/or fire support, which again raise the importance 
of a thorough planning process. The phrase “the more planning, the better” applies to 
most types of military operations, but certainly the higher the stakes and the more 
complex the type operation is, the more detail that is required. The littoral special 
operations are, in most cases, a combination of both several units’ involved and high 
stakes.  
The Inchon landing is an excellent example of the importance of deliberate 
planning in support of littoral operations. During the initial North Korean invasion of the 
Republic of Korea in 1950, the UN forces had been pushed back deep into the Korean 
                                                 
79 McRaven, Spec Ops, 3–4. 
80 Ibid., 208–15. 
81 Mark Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah: The First Battle in America’s War with Militant Islam 
(New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006), 467. 
 29 
south. The commander of the UN forces, General Douglas MacArthur, came up with the 
brilliant idea to create a second front behind the North Korean lines by conducting an 
amphibious landing. Inchon was situated close to Seoul and would create a much-needed 
break for the UN forces in the South and essentially cut the North Korean army in half 
and disrupt their lines of communication.82 From MacArthur first considered the idea, 
just days after the loss of Seoul in June, it took nearly three months of detailed planning 
and preparation until the operation was executed in September. 
Many military commanders and politicians opposed the idea because of the 
extreme tides and narrow channel leading into Inchon.83 However, MacArthur was able 
to get the landing approved. With two narrow channels and strong currents that needed to 
be negotiated, planning needed to be precise to ensure the landing force’s approach was 
timed precisely to mitigate the hydrographic challenges.84 The natural obstacles coupled 
with the seawalls surrounding the small harbor meant the North Koreans would not 
expect an amphibious landing there.85 
To mitigate these challenges, deliberate steps were taken to improve the 
probability of success. The amphibious landing force directed a small SOF force to 
reconnoiter the area for the specific tidal conditions and to identify mines that would 
disrupt the landing.86 The information from this operation was then used to update the 
landing plan. Additionally, the UN units further overcame these challenges with 
rehearsals and careful preparations. The daring landing was a huge success and turned the 
war for the UN forces.  
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2. Tailored Force 
Several military theorists emphasize the importance of attacking with mass and at 
a decisive point. Theorists including Kautilya, Machiavelli, and Jomini also emphasize 
the correct use of troops for the terrain and the task at hand. Within the littorals, it is 
important to be able to cross domains and fight within those domains. A tailored force 
will allow this. U.S. Army doctrine further describes force tailoring and its importance as 
“the process of determining the right mix and sequence of units”87 and that “units 
identified for rapid deployment are tailored to mission requirements.”88 The U.S. Navy 
also emphasizes the tailoring concept. “Our Maritime Forces will be tailored to meet the 
unique and evolving requirements particular to each geographical region, often in 
conjunction with special operation forces and other interagency partners.”89 
A tailored force is very important in littoral special operations because each 
mission requires a custom-designed task organization to increase the probability of 
success. Even reaching the mission objective area often requires the force to transit 
between the air, sea surface, potentially sea subsurface, and land domains, each with its 
own specified means of mobility, which could in many cases significantly restrict the 
force size. In such situations, the inclusion of every operator must be considered carefully 
to ensure the best possible force in the objective area.  
While one might be tempted to solve these unique types of operations by sending 
a standard Task Force or Task Group, the solution need to be more complex than that. 
Since insertion and extraction in the littoral environment are more difficult, one must 
carefully consider how the force for the mission is organized. Every operator and staff 
member’s skill set must be carefully considered to reach the maximum potential of the 
force to succeed in the mission. For example, creative insertion crafts as Seal Delivery 
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Vehicles (SDVs), canoes, kayaks, or water jets give excellent cover from the enemy, but 
limit the number of operators on the mission. Submarines and ships have limited space 
for SOF operators, staff, assets, and equipment, which forces the commander to carefully 
consider each individual needed for the operation. The Italian manned-torpedo attack on 
British ships during WWII is an excellent example of how a force can be tailored to the 
needs of the operation.90 
In 1975, after the Vietnam War, the U.S. government faced a hostage situation 
when Cambodian authorities arrested a U.S. merchant ship, the Mayaguez. The Hostage 
Release Operation (HRO) launched to save the Mayaguez’s crew is an example of poor 
tailoring of force, where U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) sent a regular U.S. Marine 
Corps unit to conduct a surgical HRO.91 They planned to conduct an amphibious landing 
and retrieve the hostages, but the resistance on the beach was too fierce, and the U.S. 
Marines had to retreat with severe casualties without achieving the mission. The hostages 
had already been released by the Cambodians.  
If SOF units are to succeed with these types of operations, they must tailor the 
force beyond the regular conventional way of dividing the companies into troops or 
troops into teams. The operational force for a special operation in the littorals must be 
considered carefully and be handpicked to fit the unique insertion capabilities and 
problems at hand. Successful special operations in this environment are conducted by 
uniquely configured force structures varying from the individual to squadron size 
operations. Thus, SOF leadership needs to think creatively when structuring forces to 
operate in the littorals.  
In 1942, in Operation Musketoon, a combined British and Norwegian force 
conducted a sabotage raid in Glomfjord, Norway. The operation is an excellent example 
of how a small force, tailored to meet an objective, and the available insertion means can 
succeed in littoral operations. The operation was designed to stop the nearby German 
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aluminum production plant by destroying the factory’s power source in Glomfjord. The 
Allied force consisted of two officers and eight commandos from the British No. 2 
Commando, two Norwegian corporals from the Norwegian Special Operations Executive 
(SOE) to serve as local area guides, and a French submarine Junon. The combined force 
selected the submarine for its similarity to the German U-boats. Infiltrating from 
Scotland, the Junon inserted the small force of the 12 operators in the Bjaerangsfjord 
south of Glomfjord (see Figure 8).92 
 
Figure 8.  French Submarine Inserts Raid Force in Glomfjord93 
After the rubber boat transit to shore, the small force crossed the mountain to 
Glomfjord. Once at the objective, the team divided into two groups, with one placing the 
charges on the water pipes leading into the power station while the other group entered 
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the power station and placed explosive charges on the generators. The force blew up the 
power station and rendered it inoperable for the remainder of the war. The team then 
divided into groups of two or three men and started their exfiltration to Sweden. Though 
the mission result was a great success, the Germans killed one Norwegian and captured 
seven British Commandos during the exfiltration. In total, only four members made it to 
Sweden and later arrived in Britain.94 The precise force configuration, tailored to the 
challenging objective, greatly contributed to the success of the operation. Although, the 
poor exfiltration plan led to one casualty and seven captured commandoes. 
3. Specified Mobility 
Because maritime SOF need to transfer between the sea, land, and air domains in 
the littorals, strategizing the best specified mobility to reach an objective area, preferably 
without engaging the enemy before one’s own choosing becomes a daunting task. The 
mobility used for these missions needs to be specific to the requirement of the domain it 
will function in and must allow the force to transfer seamlessly between and into the next 
domain. It is essential for a SOF force to maneuver with as few restrictions as possible to 
strike the usually larger enemy force when and where they intend. 
Mobility is essential to move the force as quickly and discreetly as possible. 
Military theorists often discuss the necessity to move forces and maneuver in the terrain 
under cover to strike the enemies’ decisive point with mass.95 Mobility facilitates the 
force’s ability to maneuver in a manner that creates an advantage. The term mobility was 
invented later when technological advances made military movement and maneuver 
much faster. Almost all the military theorists mention the importance of maneuver.  
Today, mobility is defined as “a quality or capability of military forces which 
permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their 
primary mission.”96 U.S. doctrine stresses the importance of mobility: “[It] … is the basis 
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of all operational success. Unless tactical movement of troops can be executed quickly 
and supply operations maintained in the necessary manner, the striking power of an army 
is severely restricted and its security from the enemy is greatly impaired.”97 The U.S. 
Army field manual further defines tactical mobility as “the ability to move rapidly from 
one part of the battlefield to another, relative to the enemy. Tactical mobility is a function 
of cross-country mobility, firepower, and protection.”98 
Littoral special operations often involve the need for a force to cross several 
domains during infiltration, conduct the operation, and then successfully egress. Success 
in crossing domains often requires mobility means that are organic both to the unit’s 
capability and to the use of external support.99 Since missions typically require a tailored 
force to achieve mission accomplishment, the supporting mobility must also be specified 
to achieve a successful and concealed infiltration, especially as the force transits between 
domains. In some cases, the required mobility must be organic, but, in other cases, 
conventional forces best provide it.  
The small submarine attack on Tirpitz again is a great example of tailoring 
mobility specific for the mission. Attacking a ship with combat-divers, a submarine, or a 
SDV may be the best solution, while for a HRO mission, a submarine may be too slow to 
provide the desired insertion speed. Every mission has a specific plan and timeline; 
therefore, the mobility must be specified to meet those requirements. Special operations 
in general often require specific insertion methods and in some cases specified mobility; 
in littoral special operations, it is the rule rather than the exception. For some missions, 
new mobility assets were designed and built specifically for that operation, the earlier 
mentioned mini submarines used against Tirpitz are a prime example.100 
In 1805, U.S. forces raided Derna, Libya, with the support of local mercenaries 
and Naval Gunfire Support (NGS). The Derna raid is an excellent example of the 
                                                 
97 War Department, Military Police, FM 19-5 (Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1944), 23. 
98 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Tactics, FM 3-90 (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 2001), 2-1. 
99 Organic mobility is owned by the SOF unit itself. External mobility is support from other military 
units. 
100 McRaven, Spec Ops, 201–45. 
 35 
importance of specified mobility for littoral operations. William Eaton commanded the 
force of ten U.S. Marines and a combined mercenary force of 200 Greeks and 200–300 
Arabs. Eaton landed with the Marines in Alexandria, Egypt, and built the force with the 
help of Hamet, the former Pasha of Tripoli.101 
Eaton’s force then marched across the desert on camels and received logistical 
support from the U.S. Navy. After the 600-mile overland movement, Eaton divided his 
army in two units and attacked the fortress in Derna from two sides while the USS Argus, 
USS Hornet, and USS Nautilus provided NGS. The innovative insertion method with 
camels meant the enemy was surprised at the audacious line of the march and surrounded 
by land and sea. By doing so, Eaton defeated a far superior fortified enemy. It was the 
first time the U.S. flag was raised on foreign soil and marked the end to the First Berber 
War.102 
4. Joint Support 
Joint support is key in littoral special operations because in many cases 
capabilities essential to mission success rest under the command of another component of 
a joint force. Joint support is perhaps only limited by the imagination of the planners and 
the risk a commander is willing to assume to achieve a desired end state. For example, a 
SOF unit may request that fixed-wing aircraft insert ground or maritime mobility 
equipment in support of an infiltration. Additionally, joint support could come in the 
form of intelligence, fire support, diversions, or on today’s ever-expanding battle space, 
support through disabling cyber-based systems that could influence the infiltration.  
Though many military theorists are primarily focused on decisive land battle, 
many do mention the importance of cooperation and unity of command. Jomini in fact 
dedicates a chapter to amphibious warfare and the use of navies to move armies to new 
battlefields.103 Operations in the littorals are the interface where all the domains meet. 
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Successful operations in this environment involve taking advantage of the niche capacity 
from the other services and domain owners. It also involves a high degree of coordination 
to avoid “blue on blue”104 incidents and potential disruptions of other friendly force 
operations in the same vicinity. Many types of special operations often utilize joint 
support; however, littoral special operations are practically impossible without joint 
support and close coordination.  
One such example is the raid on Pointe du Hoc to support the June 6, 1944 Allied 
D-Day landings at Normandy and the American landing on Omaha Beach.105 A 
prominent landmark at Omaha Beach was the 100ft cliff at Pointe du Hoc. From this 
location, the German Army had a strong tactical advantage over the Allied amphibious 
landing force since it could easily employ heavy weapons from there. Three companies of 
the U.S. Army’s 2nd Ranger Battalion conducted a vertical cliff assault at Pointe du Hoc 
with the aim to destroy any German resistance that would endanger the invasion.106 
The Ranger assault on Pointe du Hoc was a true joint operation. Several days 
before the landing, Allied air strikes heavily bombarded German positions near Pointe du 
Hoc. During D-Day itself, the Rangers used several amphibious crafts, supported by the 
navy, to cross from the maritime domain onto the land domain. During the amphibious 
landing and the actual cliff assault, the USS Satterlee and HMS Talybont supported them 
with NGS to prevent the Germans from firing on the Rangers.107 
The Rangers succeeded in taking Pointe du Hoc and eliminating any German 
threats to the remainder of the Allied forces on D-Day. Without full cooperation between 
the services, victory would not have been possible.  
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5. Cover and Concealment 
Cover and concealment are very important in littoral special operations because 
these missions typically involve a smaller numerical force that must move between 
several domains to avoid or challenge a numerically superior force. The best way to 
achieve this goal is to avoid the enemy by using the cover of terrain, weather, or 
deception. Not unique to the littorals or special operations, the use of terrain as cover for 
the movement of troops or defensive purposes is as old as warfare itself. “In making 
tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your 
dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies, from the 
machinations of the wisest brains.”108 Clausewitz also stresses the advantages both 
defensively and offensively for the use of terrain to gain an advantage:  
The terrain (the ground or country) offers two advantages in warfare. The 
first is that it presents obstacles to the enemy’s approach. These either 
make his advance impossible at a given point, or force him to march more 
slowly and to maintain his formation in columns, etc. The second 
advantage is that obstacles in the terrain enable us to place our troops 
under cover. Although both advantages are very important, I think the 
second more important than the first. In any event, it is certain that we 
profit from it more frequently, since in most cases even the simplest 
terrain permits us to place ourselves more or less under cover. Formerly 
only the first of these advantages was known and the second was rarely 
used. But today the greater mobility of all armies has led us to use the 
former less frequently, and therefore the latter more frequently. The first 
of these two advantages is useful for defense alone, the second for both 
offense and defense.109 
It is also important to cover one’s intentions and force dispositions. Machiavelli, 
Fredrick the Great, and Foch all mention the importance of secrecy for success in war.110 
The UK, the United States, and Russia have all incorporated security into their principles 
of war, and McRaven recommends it for SOF. For this research, security is incorporated 
into the principle called “cover and concealment.”  
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Cover and concealment can be vital for SOF in the littorals. Compromise by the 
enemy during an insertion is likely to result in mission failure before the operation even 
starts. Almost all types of maritime insertion methods are based on cover and 
concealment. These types of insertions are often slower than land- or air-based mobility 
and include long-range insertion crafts, RHIBs, SDVs, kayaks, zodiacs, and divers, all of 
which are extremely vulnerable to enemy action if compromised during either the 
mission ingress or egress. Add in the requirement to transit forces between types of craft, 
and the risk further increases.  
The most vulnerable moment for any SOF force in the littorals is the transfer from 
one domain to another. During Operation Musketoon in Norway 1942, the SOE operators 
inserted by rubber dinghies. When approaching land in Bjaerangsfjord, the operators 
must have landed with their dinghies and hid them somewhere in the beach zone. In the 
moment when they were carrying their dinghies on land, they were the most vulnerable, 
with 70–90 kg on their backs in the strand zone and the closest friendly forces submerged 
off the coast.111  
Similarly, when a helicopter is landing to drop off personnel, it is also at high risk. 
Operation Gothic Serpent, best known from the movie Black Hawk Down, is probably the 
best example of failure due to the danger during transfer. If a SOF force is discovered 
when transferring from one environment to the other, the enemy can surprise them and 
outgun them. Cover or concealment is hence a vital principle for success in the littoral 
domain. This principle is important in other domains as well but not to the same degree.  
During the summer of 1942, the elite Marine Raider 2nd Battalion, commanded 
by Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson, received orders from Admiral Chester Nimitz to 
conduct an amphibious raid on the Makin Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. The mission had 
multiple objectives: to destroy Japanese installations on the island, to divert Japanese 
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attention and reinforcements from Guadalcanal and Tulagi, to take prisoners, and to gain 
intelligence.112 
In order to avoid detection by the Japanese during the transit to Makin, on August 
8, 1942, the Marine Raiders embarked on two submarines, the Nautilus and Argonaut, 
which were both large enough to facilitate a company of Marine Raiders. After eight days 
underway, which was mainly subsurfaced, the Marine Raiders reached Makin Atoll in the 
Gilbert Islands, still undetected by the Japanese. Under the cover of darkness on August 
17, the Marine Raiders completed the last leg of the infiltration as they moved by rubber 
boats to shore.113 Although severe weather conditions and miscommunication hampered 
the landing, the Raiders successfully infiltrated. Although, an accumulation of mishaps 
and leadership decisions, the mission eventually resulted in failure. 
On August 18, the Raiders tried to make their way back to the submarine. 
Technical problems with the outboard engines on the rubber boats combined with heavy 
surf made this a difficult task. In the chaos, nine Raiders were left behind on Makin and 
later beheaded by the Japanese.114 Though the Raiders failed to meet their objectives and 
took unnecessary casualties during exfiltration, the use of the submarines to support 
mother ship delivery allowed the raiding force to move into and from the target area 
undetected and eventually return to Pearl Harbor.  
6. Innovation 
Innovation is important for all types of special operations, but it is vital for special 
operations in the littorals where the margins for failure are much smaller. Littoral 
operations are complex and risky, especially when the force transitions from one domain 
to another (e.g., air to water, subsurface to surface, or water to land). Most militaries or 
forces prepare for the next war or engagement using experiences of the last conflict. 
However, when things are constantly changing the exposure to the force when 
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transferring from domains makes innovation vital to succeed. To help achieve success 
under these arduous conditions in the littorals, innovation allows the force to outmatch 
the enemy with new tactics and equipment. Developing new technologies, doctrine, 
tactics, and organizational models can create an advantage for an operational unit by 
employing certain means the enemy has never seen before, thus creating more than 
simply a tactical surprise. The 9/11 attacks are an excellent example of how a small force 
can attack a superior force by surprise by using innovative and unexpected methods. At 
the time of the attack, no one anticipated terrorists would ever employ civilian airliners as 
cruise missiles to target buildings. Thus, the challenge to innovate continually in order to 
seek an advantage over one’s opponents becomes a matter of survival.115 Though 
innovation is not a principle of war that military theorists have emphasized previously, 
large militaries and their SOF elements have focused on similar principles such as 
flexibility, initiative, and surprise to gain immediate tactical advantages. Innovation, 
however, takes place primarily prior to tactical execution, and thus, the true work 
surrounding innovation rests with developing the new technologies, doctrine, and tactics 
that will keep the enemy off balance. Stephen Rosen, in Innovation and the Military—
Winning the Next War, emphasizes the difficulty of innovation: 
All social innovation is difficult. Machiavelli noted over four hundred 
years ago that ”there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more 
doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new 
order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the 
old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by 
the new order … the incredulity of mankind who do not truly believe in 
anything new until they have had actual experience of it.116 
Isaacson, Layne, and Arquilla, in their RAND Corporation presentation on 
Predicting Military Innovation, define innovation as “for a specific military, innovation is 
manifested by the development of new war fighting concepts and/or new means of 
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integrating technology.”117 Isaacson et al. divide innovation in the military into three 
distinct types of innovation: organizational innovation, doctrinal innovation, and 
technological innovation. If the technology is improved, then the organization and its 
doctrine (concepts and tactics) will also need to change to adapt to the new technology, 
and in turn, changes in organization or doctrine should lead to changes in technology:118 
Future warfare will likely be won by those who maintain the offensive. 
Forces that are proactive and in constant pursuit of the enemy will enjoy a 
greater advantage than those who content themselves with reacting and 
responding to an elusive foe. The former will constantly seek out new and 
innovative methods for maintaining the upper hand while simultaneously 
striking the adversary in a pre-emptive manner to keep him continually off 
balance.119 
Innovation is an important principle for littoral special operations due to the 
complexity of operating in nine subdomains simultaneously and the disadvantage of the 
attacker. In transferring from maritime to the land domain, a littoral special operation 
may falter from exposure to the enemy. Developing new methods in organizing the 
operators and their tactics and adapting new technology is vital to succeed with every 
mission. The defender will prepare for attacks replicating prior tactics, force structure, 
and technology. Maritime SOF preparing for littoral operations must innovate to succeed.  
Norwegian saboteurs in Oslo during WWII learned the importance of innovation 
the hard way. After several underwater attacks on German ships during WWII, the 
Germans started to employ diving nets, rigid guard routines, and random shooting and 
dropping of grenades into the water to protect their ships. During Operation Bundle, the 
Norwegian SOE operatives in Oslo wanted to sink the German troop transport Donau, 
and they tried several different techniques including frogmen, small torpedoes, and 
canoes.120 In the end, they figured that they needed a totally new approach to trick the 
German defenses. Inevitably, they disguised themselves as harbor workers and entered 
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under the pier of the Donau through the sewage system at the harbor to place limpets. 
Their sabotage resulted in the sinking of the Donau and delivered a large blow to moving 
German troops from Norway to the eastern and western fronts on continental Europe.121 
During WWII, Italy faced a superior British Navy in the Mediterranean Sea. To 
counter the imbalance, the Italian Navy used an innovative naval unit called the Decima 
Mas (10th Assault Vehicle Flotilla or X-MAS). The Decima Mas consisted of highly 
motivated and trained combat-divers. Working in close corporation with Italian industry, 
X-MAS developed the latest diving equipment. One such innovation credited to X-MAS 
is the first use of manned torpedoes to conduct sabotage missions in enemy harbors.122 
As an operational concept, a submarine would transport the torpedoes with 
combat-divers close to the enemy harbors. A few miles from the targets, the submarine 
would then launch the divers and torpedoes, and then the divers would maneuver the 
torpedo towards the enemy ship. With entrances to the harbor often heavily guarded and 
protected by anti-submarine nets made of steel, the divers would navigate around or 
under these obstacles, or even cut through them.123 Figure 9 illustrates the kind of 
obstacles that frogmen on their torpedo encountered.  
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Figure 9.  Frogmen of X-MAS on a Torpedo Cutting an Anti-submarine Net124 
Once the divers reached their target, they would completely submerge the torpedo 
and place it under the keel of the ship, activate the timer, and start their escape to shore or 
try to egress to an awaiting boat. In order to conduct such challenging missions, the 
combat-divers of X-MAS had to be innovative with their equipment. They modified the 
existing compressed-air diving equipment into rebreathers suitable for tactical use.125 To 
navigate underwater, they had to have waterproof depth meters and watches that were 
readable in dark waters.126 
By innovating their equipment and procedures and combining these new 
capabilities with the use of submarines, the X-MAS sank more tonnage than the entire 
conventional Italian Navy did during WWII.127 The X-MAS conducted successful 
sabotage missions at Alexandria, Malta, and Gibraltar. The Italians were so successful 
                                                 
124 Original image by Rudolf Claudus, courtesy of the Marina Militare, reprinted in Naval War 
College Review 68, no. 3 (summer 2015): 1.  
125 Rebreathes are diving equipment with an internal CO2 filter that ensures no bubbles and makes it 
almost impossible to spot a diver from the surface. 
126 These were developed by the famous watchmaker Panerai, who ensured visibility in dark 
conditions by using radium bromide and zinc sulphide on his instruments. 
127 Greene and Massignani, Black Prince and the Sea Devils, 138. 
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that the British Navy quickly adapted and started their own program with manned 
torpedoes, the so-called Chariot.128 The success of X-MAS illustrates how innovation in 
the littorals can overcome a conventional disadvantage. 
D. CASE STUDY LOGIC, SELECTION, AND ANALYSIS 
Five historical (1667–2011) special operations are used to test the importance of 
the six principles.  
To demonstrate the importance these six principles play in littoral special 
operations, five historical operations are used to demonstrate the importance of these six 
principles with cases from the seventeenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries. These 
examples are selected because they represent a variety of operations with different 
sponsors, doctrines, and geographies to show each principle’s importance in the 
preparation and conduct of littoral special operations: 
A. Raid on Chatham: Royal Netherlands Marine Corps (1667) 
B. Ship attack Oslo Harbor: Norwegian Special Operations Executive (1943) 
C. Pebble Island Raid, Falklands: British Special Air Service (1982) 
D. Mumbai attacks: Lashkar-e-Taiba (2008) 
E. Somali Pirate Ship Attack: Netherlands Marine Special Operations Forces 
(2011) 
The five cases of littoral special operations cover four continents, three centuries, 
and five different forces (including one international terrorist group). The variety of the 
cases helps demonstrate how these principles are applicable regardless of the executing 
force, the doctrine, equipment and technology available, or the timeframe. The cases also 
offer cross-domain variation where some of these operations were conducted from the sea 
to the land, some from land to sea and others from the air to sea or land. In total, the cases 
give a good idea of the importance of the principles.  
                                                 
128 Greene and Massignani, Black Prince and the Sea Devils, 138. 
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1. Analysis of Cases  
Each case study is analyzed using a narrative of each operation that covers the 
background for the operation, its objectives, and the result of the operation. Thereafter, 
each case is evaluated using the six principles presented earlier to assess whether the 
principles were important or not to the overall mission outcome. Though the analysis is 
chiefly qualitative in nature, accompanying the assessment of the role of each principle is 
an ordinal scoring (1–5) with a “1” being irrelevant to mission accomplishment and a “5” 
being highly important to mission success.   
2. Rating Scale for Principles 
A Likert rating scale is used to measure the importance of each principle for each 
case with a scale ranging from “Irrelevant to Mission Success” (1), “Less Important to 
Mission Success” (2), “Moderate Importance to Mission Success” (3), “Important to 
Mission Success” (4), to “Very Important to Mission Success” (5). The score for each 
principle is determined by evaluating the degree of importance each principle had to the 
outcome of the operation in question.129 The scale ranges from 1–5, and the scores are 
presented in Table 1.  
1. IRRELEVANT means that the principle did not influence the operational 
outcome at all. 
2. Less important means that the principle did influence the operation, but it 
ENHANCED the likelihood of mission success with only a minor impact.  
3. Moderate importance means that the principle made a considerable impact 
on ENHANCING the likelihood of overall mission success.  
4. Important means that the principle was essential for overall mission 
success. ESSENTIAL is further defined as the consideration of or 
employment of the principle in question is necessary to accomplish the 
mission.  
5. Very important means that the principle was critical for mission success. 
CRITICAL is further defined as the mission would likely FAIL without 
the proper consideration of or employment of the principle in question. 
Table 1 is an example of how each principle is rated, using the scale for one case study. 
                                                 
129 Scale inspired by by http://www.hr-survey.com/PfRatingScales.htm, accessed March 28, 2016. 
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Table 1.   Rating an Example Operation 
 
 
To better visualize the principles for each case, the study employs a radar figure 
to compare the importance of each of the six principles (see Figure 10). The radar figure 
consists of five concentric hexagons with each concentric hexagon ring representing one 
of the values on the five-point Likert scale (1–5). With six principles to compare, each 
point that connects two sides of the hexagon represents one of the six principles (see 
Figure 10). With the qualitative definitions above, each principle is assessed with an 
ordinal value and plotted at the appropriate intersection for each principle on the radar 
figure. The outcome is a six-sided geometric shape displayed onto the radar figure. If 
each of the six principles has the same point value for a specific case, then the hexagon 
will be equilateral and regular in shape. However, most likely, variation exists between 
point values for the different principles, and thus a six-sided geometric shape will be 
irregular in appearance (see Figure 10.)  
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Figure 10.  Example Operation with Visualization of Principles 
The radar figure is also suitable to compare the importance of each principle, 
case-by-case, as each case’s hexagon is overlaid upon the radar figure backdrop. 
Layering the hexagons associated with each case accommodates an across case 
comparison to show which principles are the most important. Additionally, an average 
score for each principle across cases is also calculated as a second metric to further show 
which principles have been evaluated as more important relative to the others examined 
in this study.  
This study concludes with a summary of the cross-case findings and an example 
of the principles in action during a feasible future scenario. Additionally, the study 
concludes with policy implications and recommendations for the next steps in a littoral 
special operations research.  
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III. HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES 
To test the validity of the six principles of littoral special operations, five 
historical special operations are analyzed. These cases were selected due to their variation 
in method, force, conflict, geography, and timeframe. The purpose of this analysis is to 
show the applicability of the principles for littoral special operation. The six cases follow 
the same outline with a narrative that covers the background for the operation, its aim, its 
execution, and the outcome.  Thereafter, each case is analyzed using the six littoral 
special operations principles.  
A. RAID ON CHATHAM: ROYAL NETHERLANDS MARINE CORPS (1667) 
This case has been selected for several reasons. First, the mission took place 
nearly 350 years ago. This is important to demonstrate the viability of the principles 
across time. Second, the mission was conducted in an environment that allowed limited 
maneuverability, an aspect that is characteristic of the littorals.  
1. Background 
During the sixteenth century, Great Britain built a stronger navy to balance its 
strength against the dominant Spanish Navy. The Dutch Navy was the third strongest 
Navy in Europe. Over centuries, this triangle of power, in which each country pursued its 
own interests, resulted in several conflicts and changing alliances between the countries. 
To protect the Dutch interests (East Indies, Suriname, Curaçao, and New Amsterdam), 
the Dutch Navy grew, as did its rivals. Around 1650, internal power conflicts in the 
Dutch Republic took their toll on the strength of both the Army and Navy. Meanwhile, 
the British continued to strengthen their navy. The power struggle between Great Britain 
and the Dutch Republic resulted in four Anglo-Dutch Wars: first war (1652–1654), 
second war (1665–1667), third war (1672–1674), and fourth war (1780–1784). The last 
war ended when the Dutch were forced to sign the Treaty of Paris in 1784. The raid on 
Chatham took place in the second Anglo-Dutch War (Figure 11).  
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Figure 11.  The Raid on Chatham130 
In 1652, the Dutch developed the first plans to sail up the river Thames to conduct 
offensive operations against the British. However, it was considered too risky since there 
was insufficient intelligence available to the Dutch on the depth of the Thames.131 The 
Second Anglo-Dutch War did not initially favor the Dutch, and they suffered several 
defeats; the British attacked trade posts in Africa and inflicted heavy losses during the 
battle of Lowestoft.132 However, the British did suffer in another way from two major 
disasters at home: the plague (1665) and the Great London Fire (1666). Both disasters 
had a great negative effect on both British morale and economy. As a result of the poor 
economy, the British King Charles II decided to bring in a large portion of his navy and 
lay off sailors and soldiers to reduce costs. He considered that his ships would be safe at 
Chatham (Figure 12). Chatham was also Great Britain’s largest shipyard.  
                                                 
130 Admin, “The Raid on Chatham (Raid on Medway), 17–23 June 1667,” History of the Sailing 
Warship in the Marine Art (blog), April 5, 2010, http://www.sailingwarship.com/the-raid-on-chatham-raid-
on-medway-17-23-june-1667.html. 
131 Bert Wezeman, “De Tocht naar Chatham, 1667” [The raid on Chatham, 1667], Historie, January 
22, 2015, http://www.historien.nl/de-tweede-engelse-oorlog-de-tocht-naar-chatham/. 




Figure 12.  Map of River Thames and Chatham133 
Meanwhile, peace talks between the Dutch Republic and Great Britain had started 
in Breda (the Netherlands), where the British were confident that they would reach an 
agreement in their favor since they had been dominant so far in their naval campaign.134 
The Dutch Republic wanted to shift the power balance back in their favor during the talks 
in Breda by attacking the vulnerable British Navy.  
Johan de Witt directed the Dutch Navy to be modernized; he was convinced that a 
strong navy was in the interest of the Dutch Republic.135 Due to this modernization, the 
Dutch Navy had specific ships with more firepower and maneuverability, instead of 
converting old merchant ships into navy ships with limited capabilities. 
                                                 
133 “The Royal Navy’s Role in Warship Research, Building, Repair & Maintenance Worldwide,” 
Naval History, August 2, 2011, http://www.naval-history.net/WW1NavyBritish-Shipbuild03.htm. 
134 Wezeman, “De Tocht naar Chatham, 1667” [The raid on Chatham]. 
135 Jonathan Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477–1806 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 767. 
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2. Aim of the Mission 
The overall aim of the raid on Great Britain was to counterbalance the dominant 
position of Great Britain in the Breda negotiations by an attack on the British Navy, some 
critical facilities of the Navy, Chatham Dockyard, and supply depots.136 According to de 
Witt, it would be “the best plenipotentiary for peace.”137 
3. Mission Execution 
The Dutch had recruited British pilots from their prisoners who had good 
knowledge of both rivers, Thames and Medway.138 Some prisoners were eager to work 
for the Dutch, since they finally received pay for their service, in contrast to the wages 
postponed by the British king. Another source of information came from a Dutch 
merchant who was spying on behalf of the Dutch in Great Britain; he provided the 
positions of large British Navy ships.139 The British took some protective measures for 
their Navy, by removing all navigation buoys on the Thames and Medway and setting up 
a few fortified positions along the riverbanks.  
The fleet, commanded by Admiral De Ruyter, with marines140 onboard, and 
commanded by Willem van Ghent, entered the Thames in June 1667.141 They sailed 
towards Sheerness Castle, which was tasked with protecting the mouth of the Medway. 
After a naval bombardment by the modernized Dutch ships, a landing force consisting of 
the newly formed Marine Corps captured the fort. The Dutch fleet continued their way 
upstream on the river Medway. Despite British-made obstacles on both rivers, the pilots 
found a way through, and the Dutch set sail to Chatham. An obstacle that caused more 
concern to the Dutch was a large chain stretched diagonally across the river close to 
                                                 
136 “The Raid on Chatham (Raid on Medway).” 
137 David Roger Hainsworth and Christine Churches, The Anglo-Dutch Naval Wars 1652–1674 
(Thrupp: Sutton Publishing, 1998), 157. 
138 Hainsworth and Churches, The Anglo-Dutch Naval Wars 1652–1674, 157. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Having Marines on board a warship was new concept for the Dutch, copied from the Portuguese 
and British Navy. 
141 “The Raid on Chatham (Raid on Medway).” 
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Gillingham, which was safeguarded by artillery.142 The Dutch broke the chain on June 22 
and destroyed several British ships by using fire ships. On June 23, the Dutch captured 
the British flagship, the Royal Charles. Although the defensive positions of the British 
were no longer effective, the Dutch could not proceed with their advance due to a falling 
tide and decided to return to the North Sea. To keep the pressure on the British during the 
peace talks, the Dutch Navy kept patrolling along the British coast. The Treaty of Breda 
was signed on August 24, 1667; both parties had to make concessions under this treaty—
for the British, this was harder to accept.  
4. Result of the Mission 
As a direct result of the raid, the British realized that they could not continue their 
war against the Dutch. Great Britain was forced to accept less than favorable conditions 
under the Treaty of Breda; the British navigation laws were relaxed, New Amsterdam 
would remain in British hands and was renamed New York, and Suriname remained a 
Dutch possession.143 More importantly, the young Dutch Republic demonstrated that it 
could hold its ground against Great Britain; the success of the raid on Medway was 
decisive in accomplishing this.144 
5. Analysis of Principles 
The operation is analyzed, applying the six principles for successful littoral 
special operations. The purpose of the analysis is to determine whether the principles 
were essential for the mission.   
a. Deliberate Planning 
The initial plan to conduct a raid on Great Britain was rejected, since there was 
not enough information present. Fifteen years after the initial plan, more intelligence on 
                                                 
142 “The Raid on Chatham (Raid on Medway).” 
143 Memory of the Netherlands, “England and the Netherlands: The Ties between Two Nations,” 
accessed March 8, 2016, 
http://www.geheugenvannederland.nl/?/en/collecties/nederland_engeland/zeeoorlogen. 
144 Wezeman, “De Tocht naar Chatham, 1667” [The raid on Chatham]. 
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the tides and waterways was gathered from British pilots and reconnaissance.145 Together 
with this critical information, as well as information from other sources on the position of 
British great ships and their defenses along the riverbanks, a detailed plan was 
constructed to conduct a raid on Chatham in the heart of British naval pride. No 
documentation was found on rehearsals with the complete fleet and marines. Deliberate 
planning was essential for this case (4/5, four out of five on the scale) for the overall 
success of the mission.  
b. Tailored Force 
A well-balanced Dutch force of ships, sailors, and marines conducted the raid; 
they had 17 smaller ships, four fire-ships, several galliots,146 and 1,000 marines.147 Each 
ship had a specific function varying from naval gunfire, fire-ship, to reconnaissance. The 
keel depth of a ship was crucial; the ships could not be too heavy, because of the shallow 
waters of the rivers Thames and Medway, and had to be fairly maneuverable due to 
limited maneuver space along the river. A balance needed to be found between regular 
Dutch sailors and marines who would fight against British soldiers and sailors. The 
Marine units were specially tasked to conduct amphibious raids on fortified positions. 
This was a new concept in the Dutch Navy and across European navies. This tailored 
force was critical (5/5) for the overall success of the mission.  
c. Specified Mobility 
As previously stated, the ships used for the raid were selected based on their keel 
depth, maneuverability, and firepower. Due to the state of technology at that time, 
mobility was limited to sailboats. Smaller ships that could support an amphibious raid 
conducted by the Dutch Marine Corps provided cross-domain mobility. Specified 
mobility was essential (4/5) for the overall success of the mission. 
                                                 
145 Hainsworth and Churches, Anglo-Dutch Naval Wars 1652–1674, 157. 
146 Flat bottom ships that are able to maneuver freely in shallow waters. 
147 Hainsworth and Churches, Anglo-Dutch Naval Wars 1652–1674, 160. 
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d. Joint Support 
In the seventeenth century, the term joint support had not yet been employed. 
However, the integration of land (army) soldiers on board navy ships was the first sign of 
mutual support or an understanding that specialized forces from other branches could be 
extremely useful. The marines on board the ships allowed the Dutch to cross from the 
maritime domain onto the land domain, and back again. It was, of course, not the first 
time that the land domain was reached from the maritime domain. However, this time it 
was done with large numbers of marines who were specifically trained and equipped for 
this task, making them more effective. The deployment of marines in such a manner had 
never before been displayed in Europe. Joint support was critical (5/5) for the overall 
success of the mission. 
e. Cover/Concealment 
No cover or concealment was used for the raid on Medway. Naval movement was 
dictated by the tides of the river; therefore, movement in darkness was considered to be 
too risky, given the navigational challenges of shallow waters and bendy rivers. De 
Ruyter was not concerned with this principle, since his intelligence indicated that the 
British were too weak to react in force in a timely manner. Therefore, operational security 
was successful, as the British were not expecting the Dutch. Cover and concealment was 
less important (2/5) for mission success, partly because the raiding force was delivered by 
a superior force.  
f. Innovation  
The innovation used in this raid was both technological and organizational. Under 
the leadership of De Witt, the navy ships were reformed before the second Anglo-Dutch 
War; new types of ships, specifically for the navy, were built instead by converting 
existing merchant ships into navy ships with limited firepower and maneuverability.148 
The organizational innovation was the creation and use of a new amphibious unit, the 
                                                 
148 Samuel McLean, “‘Victory Was Everywhere.’ Johan de Witt, Decision-Making and the Raid on 
the Medway (1667),” British Naval History, October 7, 2015, http://www.britishnavalhistory.com/victory-
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Dutch Marine Corps. The marines from the newly-formed Marine Corps were mainly 
recruited from the army, and were commanded by a former army commander who was 
brought into the navy, Lieutenant-Admiral Van Ghent.149 This was the first time the 
marines were used in combination with the navy; therefore, innovation was critical (5/5) 
for mission success. 
6. Conclusion  
The principles for successful special operations in the littorals were analyzed 
against the operation and saw the principles hold, in various degrees. Five out of six 
principles were considered important or very important for mission success. The only 
principle not considered important was cover and concealment. The points given for each 
principle are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2.   Chatham Raid: Rating of Principles 
 
Due to extremely difficult terrain (unpredictable, shallow, and bendy waterways), 
the Dutch decided to put less emphasis on the principle of cover/concealment. In this 
operation, the superior force numbers meant the lack of cover and concealment did not 
influence the outcome. Figure 13 shows the analysis of the principles in a radar figure.  
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Figure 13.  Chatham Raid Analysis 
In the hexagram, the further each point is from the center, the more important the 
principle is for overall success. The figure gives a clear indication that five out of six 
principles are important for mission success. Overall, the case helped to show the 
significance of five of the six principles. 
B. OSLO HARBOR SHIP ATTACK: OPERATION MARDONIUS 
NORWEGIAN SOE (1943) 
As a case where the force came from land and conducted an operation in littoral 
waters, the Oslo harbor ship attack is the only case from the WWII period, when most 
countries first established formal Special Forces. The case signifies one of two operations 
in this study conducted on occupied territory. It also represents one of the most daring 
missions conducted by Norwegian Special Forces.150 
1. Background 
On April 9, 1940, German forces invaded Norway as part of Operation 
Weserübung. During World War I (WWI), the British Royal Navy effectively denied the 
                                                 
150 It would also be the predecessor for what today is Norwegian Naval SOF. 
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German High Seas Fleet (Hochseeflotte) access to the Atlantic by creating a blockade 
between Scotland and Norway, and England and France. The aim of the Germans was to 
prevent a similar blockade between Scotland and Norway. The second aim for invading 
Norway was to ensure access to the Swedish iron ores, which were transported by train to 
Narvik in northern Norway and then shipped to Germany. The iron was used for building 
U-boats and warships for Germany.151 
Once the Germans initiated Operation Weserübung, the Norwegian government 
surrendered or fled to Britain in a few days.152 Many young Norwegians escaped to 
Britain to join the allied fight against the Germans, enlisting in the Norwegian Armed 
Forces, which fought under British command. A small unit called the Norwegian 
Independence Company No. 1, later renamed Company Linge after their first 
commander, was formed as part of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE).153 
The Company recruited the finest Norwegian soldiers who received special training to 
conduct propaganda, sabotage, special operations, intelligence work, and lead the 
resistance in Norway.154 Two of these men were Max Manus and Gregers Gram. 
While going through SOE training, Manus and Gram discussed attacking German 
shipping in Norway. The Germans relied on ship transport to move Norwegian Jews to 
Germany, to transport troops to the Eastern Front and supplies to Norway (see Figure 14). 
A strike on their shipping would disrupt their logistics significantly. For this purpose, 
Manus built new limpets consisting of magnets and a time fuse that dissolved in saltwater 
that could be left on the ship hull.155 They made several attempts to get the operational 
                                                 
151 Richard D. Hooker and Christopher Coglianese, Operation Weserübung and the Origins of Joint 
Warfare (Washington, DC: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1993), 
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plans approved by their commanders. After making the plan very detailed, it was finally 
approved.156 
 
Figure 14.  Norwegian Jews Awaiting Transportation via SS Donau to Nazi 
Concentration Camps157 
2. Aim of the Mission 
The overall aim of the mission was to disrupt German logistics by damaging or 
sinking as many ships as possible in Oslo Harbor. A successful mission would hamper 
the Germans’ ability to deport Jews from Norway to the concentration camps in Germany 
and Poland. It would also stop German troop transports from Norway to the Eastern 
Front.158 A successful attack in the middle of the Norwegian capital would also 
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157 Later sunk by Manus and his colleagues in the Norwegian Company Linge. Ryde.org, accessed 
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158 Michael Tillotson, SOE and the Resistance: As Told in the Times Obituaries (London: Continuum 
International Publishing Group, 2011), 62–63. 
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demonstrate Allied capabilities to strike German forces in their safe havens. In Norway, 
any successful resistance against the Germans would help to boost the morale of the 
occupied people and their resistance fighters. 
3. Mission Planning 
Manus and Gram’s plan was to cross the North Sea by plane and be dropped by 
parachute into the woodlands east of Oslo.159 Then they would build a camp in the forest, 
link up with the local resistance, and recruit locals to join the ship attack. They would 
conduct reconnaissance on the harbor and potential targets, and acquire canoes to conduct 
the operation. The initial plan was to conduct a large-scale attack on German ships, using 
up to ten canoes, manned by Manus, Gram, and 18 local Norwegians armed with limpets, 
in a swarmed-based attack. Once the ship attack was executed, Manus and Gram planned 
to escape from Norway on foot to Sweden and from there make their way to Great 
Britain.160 
4. Mission Execution 
The insertion from Britain did not go as planned. On 12 March 1943, the team 
was dropped at the wrong location, and the equipment got spread across the forest. Once 
they recovered their equipment, they set up their camp.161 Manus became severely ill, 
which resulted in a delay of five days. Once contact was made with the local resistance, 
they established a Forward Operating Base (FOB) in Ljan. From Ljan, they started their 
reconnaissance of Oslo harbor. They observed that the Germans patrolled the harbor with 
three patrol boats, and the pier and ships had anti-sabotage guards patrolling. They also 
gained intelligence from Norwegian workmen at the harbor, who also helped them to 
smuggle 30 limpets inside the harbor.162 
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Initially, there were enough local Norwegians interested to join the sabotage 
operation. However, once the plan was shared, the volunteers backed off because they 
thought it was too risky. In the end, they were left with only two volunteers, Halvor 
Haddeland and Einar Riis Johansen, to join the sabotage mission with the canoes. Instead 
of the large-scale swarm attack, they went for stealth and guile. One local shipyard 
worker, Sigurd Jacobsen, would place limpets on several ships that same night at Aker 
Mech (see Figure 15.)163 
 
Figure 15.  Akers Mek Verksted: Shipyard in Oslo164 
The saboteurs prepositioned equipment and explosives on Bleikøya, one of the 
islands close to the target harbor.165 They planned to row to the island in daytime, wait 
for darkness, then row the last distance to the harbor, and place the limpets on the ships. 
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The operation would be executed under the cover of darkness and clouds. The team 
found the perfect night and initiated the operation. Unfortunately, the cloud cover 
dissolved, the quay was busy with Germans shipping goods, and the sky was lit up like 
daytime. 
On 27 April 1943, the saboteurs left in two canoes from Ljanskollen in daytime 
and, as a distraction, they started to paddle towards Nesodden.166 Then, they turned and 
started to paddle towards Hovedøya and Blekøya. When passing Hovedøya, the German 
watchtower guards followed the two canoes closely with binoculars. However, the guards 
did not notice the British battle uniforms and the weapons in the canoes. They also passed 
several German soldiers relaxing on a beach. Strangely, none of the Germans did 
anything to stop the canoes.167 
The teams approached Blekøya and pulled the canoes onshore. They were 
positioned close to the targets and in sight of the German guards in the watchtower at 
Hovedøya. To avoid attention, the saboteurs behaved like sightseers. The men prepared 
their canoes for the sabotage. Manus left some British cigarettes, a letter to Admiral 
Dönitz signed by Corporal Atkins in the Royal Navy, and one limpet with a timed fuse 
left to create a distraction when the other limpets went off.168 
The men paddled around Sjursøya and began to spot the German ships in the 
harbor. There were three targets on Aker Mech.169 At Grønlia, there were two ships, 
Tuguela and von Knipprode. In the main harbor, there were several other ships. The 
canoes split up and started their final approach. As the team got closer, they saw a lot of 
activity, noticed that the harbor was lit up, and that the Germans were supplying the 
ships.170 
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The team was able to maneuver around the guards and the patrol boats to place 
limpets on Tuguela.171 Von Knipprode was also well lighted, so Manus decided to drop 
the target.172 Once the limpets were placed, they paddled for their lives back to 
Ljankloppen and met the others.173 Gram and Halvor had escaped the patrol boat by 
hiding on land, close to the main harbor, and then successfully placed limpets on three 
ships from their canoes. 
The teams left one by one: Halvor and Einar went home, while Manus and Gram 
met up at Martinsen’s farm.174 Including Sigurd’s work, they had planted limpets on 
seven ships in total. Ortelsburg and Tuluega were destroyed together with a smaller 
bunker boat.175 The limpets on Aker Mech had a malfunction and were spotted by one of 
the workers later in the day. The last ship Gram had placed limpets on also had a 
malfunction, and the Germans pulled it ashore and removed the limpets. The detonators 
had gone off on all the limpets; however, the detonators’ charges were too small to 
detonate the plastic explosive underwater for most of the limpets. Manus and Gram made 
their way to Sweden on foot and then from Sweden to Britain by a merchant ship.176 
5. Result of the Mission 
Although the limpets only worked on three of the seven ships, the operation was a 
big success. The operation hampered the Germans’ ability to move personnel and 
supplies to vital locations. The most important result was to demonstrate Allied capability 
to attack the German occupiers in Norway, which created a morale boost for the 
                                                 
171 Christensen, Oslogjengen [The Oslo Gang]. 
172 Manus, Mitt Liv [My life], 166–68. 
173 Christensen, Oslogjengen [The Oslo Gang]. 
174 Martinsen was a local farmer living close to their initial landing site in the woodlands. He helped 
them store equipment and supported the local resistance. 





176 Christensen, Oslogjengen [The Oslo Gang]. 
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Norwegian population and resistance. The people of Oslo celebrated the sinking of the 
ships like it was Norwegian Independence Day.  
During the attack, 24 Germans died on Ortelsburg and one German was injured 
on Tuluega. Figure 16 illustrates the result of the attack and a picture of Manus. The 
Germans believed it was a British submarine with combat-divers that had conducted the 
attack. No Norwegian workers were suspected.177 Manus and Gram were both invited to 
meet the Norwegian King Haakon in London to receive his gratitude for the success of 
the operation, and both were awarded the War Cross with a Sword medal.178 
 
Figure 16.  Ship Sunk by Manus and His Colleagues at Aker Mech 
Shipyard/Picture of Manus in Uniform179 
                                                 
177 Manus, Mitt Liv [My life], 170–72. 
178 Ibid., 174–76. It is equivalent to the Medal of Honor. 
179 Osloby [Oslo city homepage], “Krigsminnekrasj pā Aker Brygge,” accessed March 10, 2016, 
http://www.osloby.no/nyheter/Krigsminnekrasj-pa-Aker-Brygge-5353455.html. 
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6. Analysis of Principles 
a. Deliberate Planning 
The operation was planned in great detail. Manus and Gram made several 
attempts to get the operation approved by the Norwegian and British commanders in 
London. Manus and Gram conducted specific training and rehearsals to be prepared for 
the operation in Scotland. However, this was the case only for Manus and Gram. For the 
local resistance, the preparations were done in the vicinity of Oslo. The operation scores 
very high on the planning phase and helps strengthen the argument for this principle in 
littoral special operations. Deliberate planning was very important (5/5) to the overall 
mission success.  
b. Tailored Force 
The force was specifically tailored for the mission. The leaders of the mission 
were Manus and Gram, both native Norwegians. It was important to act as normal 
civilians in Norway and blend in, which reduced the chance of them being compromised. 
Manus and Gram wanted to try and get more canoes involved, but in the end, the force 
was sufficient to carry out the operation. A small force had less chance to be detected by 
German patrol boats, guards on the pier or the ships. The small footprint made it also 
possible to move into Oslo without being spotted by the Germans. The operation scores 
high on the tailoring of force and reinforces the importance of this principle. Tailored 
force was critical (5/5) to the overall mission success. 
c. Specified Mobility 
The saboteurs used specified mobility for this operation. They were transported 
from Britain in a Douglas airplane and parachuted into the woodlands in Norway. Then 
they used foot and bicycle transport around Oslo, before conducting the actual ship attack 
with canoes. After the attack, they used foot and bicycle to get across the Swedish border. 
The use of canoes for the actual ship attack was a good choice and completely 
unexpected by the Germans. The operation scores high on this principle. Specified 
mobility was critical (5/5) to the overall mission success. 
 66 
d. Joint Support 
Without the support of the Royal Air Force, the saboteurs would not have inserted 
successfully. They also received essential support from the local resistance who hid 
equipment and provided safe houses, their resources, and three locals who joined the 
operation. The operation could not have been conducted without this support, and 
therefore it scores high on jointness. Joint support was essential (4/5) to the overall 
mission success. 
e. Cover/Concealment 
The operation took place on occupied territory, so the saboteurs had very little 
chance of any external support during the operation in Norway. Cover and concealment 
became an important instrument of success. The air insertion, for example, was 
dependent on concealment. Subsequently, the saboteurs used the forest and the local 
farmer to cover their presence. They used disguise to move around Oslo without being 
spotted, as the Germans were seeking both Gram and Manus for previous propaganda 
operations.180 The most vital part of the operation was the infiltration by canoes in 
daytime when they appeared to be normal people on an outdoor activity. Norwegians are 
very fond of outdoor activity, and dressing up as a hiker was a very effective way to 
blend in. They used the cover of darkness and the silent approach by a canoe to place the 
limpets. On their way to Sweden, they also disguised themselves as hikers to move safely 
across the countryside. The Germans did not know of the mission, and the locals did not 
inform the Gestapo of the presence of Manus and Gram in Oslo; hence, the mission 
scores high on security. This principle was also vital for the team to succeed with their 
mission. Cover and concealment was critical (5/5) to the overall mission success. 
                                                 
180 Manus and Gram conducted several propaganda operations in Norway prior to escaping to Britain 
and joining the SOE. The German Gestapo already wanted them for these operations. 
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f. Innovation 
Manus and Joakim Rønneberg181 created a new type of limpet mine, which 
allowed them to execute the operation. The use of canoes to infiltrate to the harbor was 
also a new concept. They were able to combine many types of insertions and the use of 
local resistance to support the operation in a very creative way. They also achieved this 
without generating any accusations against the local workers at Akers Mech and the other 
harbors. 
The team used military insertion from Britain and then shifted to a civilian cover 
when safely established in the Norwegian woodlands. Then they used British battle 
uniforms during the night operation and shifted back to civilian cover when infiltrating to 
Sweden and Britain. It was a very effective and creative way of ensuring cover and 
concealment at every stage of the operation. The operation all in all scores very high on 
innovation both in methods, team configuration and technology. Innovation was critical 
(5/5) to the overall mission success. 
7. Conclusion 
The operation was very successful and used all the principles to successfully 
conduct special operations in the littorals. From Table 3, one can see that the operation 
scored “important” or “very important” on all the principles. Joint support was the only 
principle that scored “important.” This case is a prime example of how important these 
principles are for littoral special operations. The Norwegian SOE operatives later used 
similar methods on several other ship attacks in Oslo and other locations in Norway in 
WWII.182 
                                                 
181 Rønneberg is another highly decorated war hero who led the Heavy Water Raid at Rjukan, 
Norway. 
182 Max Manus: Man of War, directed by Joachim Rønning, Espen Sandberg, Oslo, Norway, 2008. 
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Table 3.   Oslo Ship Attack: Rating of Principles 
 
 
This operation is an excellent example of how a small team of SOF operators can 
create a strategic effect on a far superior enemy by preparing and executing operations in 
a creative, daring, and thorough way. The hexagram in the radar figure shown in Figure 
17 shows an almost perfect score.  
 
Figure 17.  Oslo Ship Attack Analysis 
Joint support is the only principle that only scores four out of five.  
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C. PEBBLE ISLAND RAID: OPERATION PRELIM, FALKLANDS (1982) 
This case was selected because it includes a large nation in a full war scenario in 
occupied territory. The operation was conducted in support of the decisive landing in San 
Carlos during the Falklands War in 1982. The operation was at the height of the Cold 
War. It is the only operation conducted both in the southern hemisphere and in South 
America, involving a large-scale airport raid. These characteristics help provide a broader 
testing ground for the principles for successful littoral special operations.  
1. Background 
In April 1982, the Argentinian Junta initiated Operation Rosario. The purpose of 
the operation was to remove the British authorities from the Falklands and to reintegrate 
the Islands into Argentina. The Argentinian landing was conducted with elite units from 
the Armada (Army) and the Infanteria de Marina (marines). It was a success with few 
casualties.183 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and the Parliament responded quickly 
to the Argentinian invasion by sending a large naval Task Force (TF) toward the 
Falklands. Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward commanded the Force.184 He planned 
Operation Corporate with the aim to reestablish British sovereignty over the Falklands. 
Included in the TF were special operation teams from the navy, army, and air force.185 
The maritime SOF unit, the Special Boat Squadron (SBS), was quickly deployed on 
multiple SR missions across East Falkland Island to help prepare an amphibious landing 
to free Stanley, the capital of the Falklands.186 Figure 18 illustrates the target area and the 
landing site on the East and West Falkland Islands. 
                                                 
183 Francis Mackay and Jon Cooksey, Pebble Island—Operation Prelim (South Yorkshire: Pen and 
Sword Military, 2007), 9. 
184 John Arquilla and Maria Moyano Rasmussen, “The Origins of the South Atlantic War,” Journal of 
Latin American Studies 33, no. 4 (November 2001): 753. 
185 “Falklands/Malvinas War,” Global Security, accessed April 25, 2016, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/malvinas.htm. 
186 Mackay and Cooksey, Pebble Island—Operation Prelim, 12. 
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Figure 18.  Map of Pebble Island and Falklands: Raid Site and Main Landing 
Site Marked187 
Admiral Woodward and his staff planned to conduct Operation Sutton, the 
amphibious landing, on the East Falkland Island in the area of San Carlos. When British 
Harriers discovered an Argentinian airfield in the vicinity of Pebble Island, it posed a 
serious threat to the landing.188 The observation was made May 10, just five days prior to 
the planned landing. All SBS teams were already deployed across the main islands in 
Observation Post (OP) or beach reconnaissance operations. The land SOF unit, the 
Special Air Service (SAS), was given the task to remove the air threat from Pebble 




                                                 
187 Gina B., “The Pebble Island Raid,” SAS Regimental Sergeant-Major (blog), November 1, 2013, 
http://peterratcliffeappreciationsociety.blogspot.com/2013/11/pebble-island-raid.html. 
188 Mackay and Cooksey, Pebble Island—Operation Prelim, 49–50. 
189 Ibid., 54–55.  
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2. Aim of the Mission 
The aim of Operation Prelim was to eliminate the air threat on Pebble Island to 
allow the amphibious landing in San Carlos to continue as planned. The SAS had two 
squadrons deployed with the maritime TF, and both took part in what would be the 
largest raid conducted by British SOF since 1956.  
3. Mission Execution 
On May 11, the SAS inserted two patrols of four men by helicopters into Garden 
Hill on West Falkland; they were equipped with two-man Klepper canoes. The SR patrols 
were planning to insert from West Falkland to Pebble Island by paddling through Whale 
Bay and landing at Phillips Cove, but due to strong winds and the high sea state, ended 
up crossing from Garden Hill to Whale Bay across land (see Figure 19).190 The heavy 
canoes were carried across the hills, and the patrols established an OP in Deep Ferney 
Valley, during daytime. Late on May 13, they paddled from Deep Ferney Valley to 
Phillips Cove and cached their canoes.191 The flat area they had identified on the map as 
a possible landing site, for the raiding force in Phillips Cove, turned out to be a small 
lake. The reconnaissance patrols had to find a new site while searching for enemy 
activity.192 
                                                 
190 Mackay and Cooksey, Pebble Island—Operation Prelim, The Klepper canoes can be disassembled 
and carried backpacks. These loads are very heavy. 
191 Cache: to hide equipment so as to later retrieve it. The cache is camouflaged to ensure the enemy 
or civilians don’t discover the equipment. 
192 Mackay and Cooksey, Pebble Island—Operation Prelim, 61. 
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Figure 19.  Pebble Island Map193 
A small team moved four miles across Pebble Island until the airport was in sight 
and established an OP east of First Mountain. The OP identified 11 Argentinian aircraft 
and reported the Argentinian force strength to the British TF. They informed the TF that 
the raid could proceed that night. The OP continued to report enemy guard routines and 
defensive positions of the Argentinian FOB.194 
The SOF operators at HMS Hermes prepared to insert by helicopter to Phillips 
Cove to link up with the reconnaissance patrols. The raiding force was 42 men strong. 
The force included one conventional naval officer, with local knowledge, and one NGS 
                                                 
193 “Everythingselectric,” accessed April 8, 2016, 
http://www.everythingselectric.com/images/geulogy/. 
194 Mackay and Cooksey, Pebble Island—Operation Prelim, 62–63. 
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controller.195 The raiding force was divided into one fire support group, one assault 
group, one command group, one covering group, and one reserve group.196 
HMS Hermes, HMS Broadsword and HMS Glamorgan would support the 
operation. The Sea King helicopters would insert the raid force from HMS Hermes, while 
HMS Broadsword would provide anti-air and anti-submarine protection. HMS 
Glamorgan would move north of Pebble Island and provide NGS for the raid force. Due 
to heavy winds, HMS Hermes had to sail far into Argentinian air coverage, but luckily, 
the Argentinians neither identified her presence nor attacked her.  
The raiding force was successfully inserted into Phillips Cove and met by the 
reconnaissance team. The team led the raiding unit up to the fire support position on the 
ridge, southeast of the airfield. Then the assault and command group moved towards the 
airfield, while the covering troop took up position between the settlement and the airfield. 
All units agreed to meet at the fire support location for withdrawal after the raid.197  
The raid force had explosive charges, M16s with 203 40mm rocket launchers, 
Light Anti-armor Weapons (LAWs) and General Purpose Machine Guns (GPMG) to 
destroy the airplanes, arms, and fuel dumps. The Pucaras,198 arms, and fuel dumps would 
be prioritized with explosive charges, while the Mentors and Skyvans would be attacked 
by small arms and rockets.199 Figure 20 illustrates the airstrip on Pebble Island after the 
attack: 
                                                 
195 The naval officer had previously lived at Pebble Island and knew the area well. 
196 Mackay and Cooksey, Pebble Island—Operation Prelim, 64–65. 
197 Ibid., 74–75.  
198 Argentinian fighter jet. 
199 Mackay and Cooksey, Pebble Island—Operation Prelim, 80. 
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Figure 20.  Picture of Airstrip on Pebble Island200 
The raid was initiated when HMS Glamorgan fired an illumination round at the 
ridge north of the airfield.201 The Argentinian defenses on the ridge fired shots in reply. 
The command group then requested high explosive rounds on the ridge from Glamorgan 
and illumination rounds from the mortars in the fire support group. The assault force 
moved from north to south and attached explosives on the Pucaras while the other planes 
were attacked with M16/203, LAW, and GPMG. One of the 203 40mm grenades went 
off close to the assault group, and a splinter injured Corporal Davey. He was taken care 
of by the troop medic and escorted to the fire support group.202 
                                                 
200 Wikipedia, s.v. “Raid on Pebble Island,” last modified January 16, 2016, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raid_on_Pebble_Island. 
201 Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Volume 2: War and 
Diplomacy (London: Routledge, 2005), 369. 
202 Mackay and Cooksey, Pebble Island—Operation Prelim, 81. 
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Argentinian defenses gave little resistance to the raiding group. The six 
Argentinian Marines on guard duty informed their commander, Lieutenant Marega, who 
prepared the pre-positioned explosive charges. The bombardment ignited some air fuel 
and lit up the area. The raid group spotted a group of Argentinian Marines preparing the 
charges on the airfield. This led to a small firefight between the forces, but the raiders 
suppressed the Marines. One more raider received an injury when the Argentinians 
detonated the pre-positioned charges. The charges were dug in to make the airfield 
unusable. Corporal Armstrong was blown off his feet, but he only suffered reduced 
hearing for a few days.203 
As first light was approaching, the raiding group blew the charges and fired the 
last rounds on the Argentinian aircraft, before they infiltrated to the fire support group.204 
The command group radioed to HMS Hermes, “Mission accomplished and ready for pick 
up.”205 They reorganized at the fire support position and moved east to the pickup point 
(PUP) while HMS Glamorgan continued to cover their retreat by NGS. As the Sea Kings 
approached the PUP, Glamorgan shifted its fire, from the ridge north of the airfield to the 
ridge between the airfield and the PUP. The raiding force was successfully picked up and 
returned to HMS Hermes.206 
4. Result of the Mission 
The raid was a huge success. All the Argentinian aircraft were destroyed beyond 
local repair. The British raiding force had destroyed most of the aircraft, even though the 
Argentinian forces had successfully destroyed the airfield with their charges. The 
operation essentially eliminated the air threat from the West Falklands against the British 
landing in San Carlos. The raid was completed without any casualties, only two minor 
injuries for the SOF operators. It demonstrated the capability of the British SOF units, 
                                                 
203 Mackay and Cooksey, Pebble Island—Operation Prelim, 82. 
204 Ibid., 83. 
205 Ibid., 84. 
206 Ibid., 84. 
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and the ability to strike Argentinian FOBs across the Falklands.207 Figure 21 illustrates 
the result of the raid. 
 
Figure 21.  A Pucara, one of 11 Destroyed by the SAS208 
5. Analysis of Principles 
a. Deliberate Planning 
The operation timeline left the reconnaissance and raid group with little time for 
planning and rehearsal. The two reconnaissance patrols were deployed 48 hours after the 
British recognized the air threat at Pebble Island. Then 48 hours later, the raiding force 
met the reconnaissance teams in Phillips Cove. However, the planning was sufficient to 
succeed with the mission. The key players in the operation were given a four-day period 
to complete. The helicopter pilots were familiar with these types of insertions after 
                                                 
207 Freedman, Official History of the Falklands Campaign, 369. 
208 Gina B., “The Pebble Island Raid.” 
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several successful insertions of SBS teams, earlier in the conflict. The naval support was 
already present, and the use of an experienced NGS controller gave the raiding force a 
huge advantage. However, the operation gave no chance to conduct full-scale rehearsals 
due to positioning in the South Atlantic Sea with Argentinian naval and air threat. 
Additionally, the timeline of the main landing in San Carlos forced the raiding group to 
speed up their planning process. The planning did, however, qualify as deliberate for the 
specific operation. The operation scores moderately important (3/5) on the principle, 
which means it made a considerable impact on mission success.   
b. Tailored Force 
The operation was conducted with a force combined by troops from two SAS 
squadrons, supported by one NGS controller and one local expert. It also included 
aviation, naval, and NGS support during the mission. The force was tailored for the 
specific mission. Limitations in carrying capacity, distance, and weather conditions on 
the Sea Kings meant the SOF commander had to carefully consider each member of his 
raiding group. The raiding force was the largest British SOF force conducting a raid since 
the 1950s and included personnel from two assault squadrons. The operation scores very 
important (5/5) on the principle, which means it made a critical impact on mission 
success.  
c. Specified Mobility 
The reconnaissance teams used a combination of naval insertion, helicopters, foot 
insertion, canoes, and foot infiltration, crossing three domains by those means, to reach 
the target area. The assault force did not use canoes but were otherwise identical in the 
use of insertion methods. Then the entire force used foot exfiltration, helicopter 
extraction, and naval extraction. The mobility was specified for the mission, but it did not 
include creating new types of insertion crafts specifically for the mission. On the scale, 
the principle scores essential (4/5), which means that it was essential for achieving 
mission success. 
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d. Joint Support 
The mission would not have been possible without joint support to the raiding 
force, and it included all the services in the British Armed Forces. First, the target was 
observed by Harrier fighter jets to confirm the airfield and Argentinian land forces at 
Pebble Island. Both the reconnaissance team and the assault force were based and 
launched from HMS Hermes during operation. The helicopter carrier inserted them all 
the way from Britain. The navy also provided NGS support during the mission. The 
operation scores very important (5/5) on the principle, which means it was critical for 
mission success.  
e. Cover/Concealment 
The British naval force considered HMS Hermes as mission critical to succeed 
with an amphibious landing on the Falkland Islands. However, during the raid on Pebble 
Island, Admiral Woodward did place substantial risk upon HMS Hermes, HMS Sutton, 
and HMS Glamorgan by exposing them to Argentinian air threat when inserting the 
reconnaissance team. Harsh wind conditions made it impossible for the Sea Kings to fly 
from outside the Argentinian air coverage. The British force encountered the same 
problem when the main raiding force was inserted. Any discovery by Argentinean air 
assets during this part of the operation could have been a disaster for the British.  
In addition, the helicopter insertions were dependent upon concealment, because 
detection during landing could result in a catastrophe. The reconnaissance force was very 
vulnerable when crossing in canoes from West Falkland Island to Pebble Island. If an 
Argentinian patrol on land or a patrol boat had discovered them, they would have been an 
easy target. The lack of radio contact while paddling and an impossible retreat to the 
British naval TF in canoes meant they would have been on their own. Similarly, the 
reconnaissance team and raid team foot infiltrations heavily depended on cover and 
concealment to succeed. The Argentinian forces did not know of the raid prior to the 
attack, hence the operation scores high on operational security. The operation was 
extremely dependent on this principle; hence it scores very important (5/5) on our scale. 
It was critical for overall mission success.  
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f. Innovation  
Although they used innovation to a certain degree, the level of innovation was not 
radical. There were few new tactics and procedures used during the Pebble Island raid. 
However, the combinations of SR patrols inserted with helicopters and Klepper canoes 
were unique. Similarly, the use of NGS during a SOF raid on an airfield was a creative 
combination, although none of these tactics were new in themselves.  
The on-scene commander had to make some difficult choices during the 
operation, which altered the plan. Firstly, the primary assault force was changed for the 
reserve when they walked off course during the insertion. Secondly, one of the objectives 
was dropped when one of the SOF operators got shrapnel in his foot. The ability to 
rapidly change and create new solutions is one of the most important characteristics of a 
SOF unit, especially in the littorals where circumstances are very dynamic. In summary, 
there were few technological innovations during this mission, but several organizational 
and doctrinal innovations. There were new approaches to accomplishing tasks and 
changes during the mission to allow for mission success.209 The principle was 
moderately important (3/5) on our scale, which indicates it made a considerable 
contribution to the mission success.  
6. Conclusion  
The Pebble Island raid was a very important contribution to the successful British 
landing in San Carlos. It helped Britain to regain control over the Falkland Islands. The 
special operation was conducted in a very complex littoral environment. However, the 
raiding force successfully achieved the desired end state for the mission, the elimination 
of the air threat in West Falkland.  
The principles for SOF success in the littorals was tested against the operation, 
and the analysis in large part saw the principles hold. The operation was deliberately 
planned, and the force was tailored to the mission. The mobility was specified and saw 
                                                 
209 Robert G. Spulak, Innovate or Die: Innovation and Technology for Special Operations (Tampa, 
FL: JSOU Press, 2010), 53. 
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combinations not seen earlier, which gives the mission elements of innovation. The on-
scene commander was also forced to change priorities during the mission.  
It was a joint mission and depended heavily on other services to succeed. The 
mission also demonstrated the importance of cover and concealment to avoid mission 
failure. Table 4 gives an overview of the rating of the principles.  
Table 4.   Pebble Island Raid: Rating of Principles 
 
 
The operation scored high on four out of six principles, and the two principles 
deliberate planning and innovation scored moderately important. Moderate importance 
means that they enhanced the likelihood of overall mission success and made a 
considerable contribution to that success. Figure 22 helps to visualize the principles in a 
radar hexagram.  
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Figure 22.  Pebble Island Raid Analysis 
The Pebble Island Raid helped to show the significance of the principles and 
especially tailored force, specified mobility, joint support, and cover and concealment. 
The limits on time made deliberate planning difficult. It is also hard to innovate when the 
planning and preparation period is constrained, and the force is onboard a helicopter 
carrier in the South Atlantic. 
D. MUMBAI TERROR ATTACK: LASHKAR-E-TAIBA (2008) 
This case is unique in nature because the mission was executed by terrorists 
against civilian targets. It demonstrates that terrorists are able to exploit the complexity of 
the littorals. The attack on Mumbai was conducted by a small tailored force, which was 
highly selected and well trained210 and caused a tremendous amount of terror in the 
largest city in India.  
 
                                                 
210 Similar to a SOF unit. 
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1. Background 
Since 1947, when the partitioning of British India took place, India and Pakistan 
have been involved in four wars and several border skirmishes. The main reasons for 
these conflicts are the disagreement over the ownership of the Kashmir area. China is 
also part of this conflict. There were also several disputes along the maritime borders of 
India and Pakistan.  
The Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT, Army of the Pure) is a Pakistani terror organization 
whose main goal is to fight the Indian republic and to destroy Hinduism and Judaism.211 
LeT was founded in 1990; it regards Hindus and Jews to be enemies of Islam, and they 
use that to justify a jihad against the two groups. LeT also recruit from the large Muslim 
population in India.212 Initially, LeT focused on suicide bombings to support the struggle 
for Kashmir. However, in 1999, the focus shifted to other parts of India as well: “LeT 
was not working for the liberation of Kashmir alone, but intended to aid the 200 million 
Muslims in India.”213 As a result, LeT conducted several attacks in India, including the 
attack against the Indian Parliament in 2001 and a railway bombing in 2006.214 
It is believed that the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the main intelligence 
agency in Pakistan, supports LeT:215 “LeT has reportedly been supported by Pakistan’s 
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) since the early 1990s as one of many paramilitary groups 
used by Pakistan as proxy forces to create instability in India.”216 
                                                 
211 Angel Rabasa et al., The Lessons of Mumbai (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), 1. 
212 Rohan Gunaratna, Mumbai Investigation: The Operatives, Masterminds and Enduring Threat, 
UNISCI Discussion Papers no. 19 (Madrid: UNISCI, January 2009), 145. 
213 Andrea Dew, “Exploiting Seams and Closing Gaps: Lessons from Mumbai and Beyond,” Journal 
of Strategic Security 5, no. 4 (Winter 2012): 22. 
214 “Lashkar-e-Taiba,” Mapping Militants, January 30, 2016. 
https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/79. 
215 Maloy Krishna Dhar, Fulcrum of Evil: ISI, CIA, Al Qaeda Nexus (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 
2006), 26. 
216 “Lashkar-e-Taiba,” Mapping Militant Organizations, January 30, 2016, 
https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/79; Jayshree Bajoria, “Lashkar-e-
Taiba (Army of the Pure) (aka Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Lashkar e-Toiba; Lashkar-i-Taiba),” Council on Foreign 
Relations, January 14, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/lashkar-e-taiba-army-pure-aka-lashkar-e-tayyiba-
lashkar-e-toiba-lashkar--taiba/p17882#p1. 
 83 
2. The Attack on Mumbai 
As part of the LeT strategy, they planned a complex and well-coordinated attack 
against civilians in the city of Mumbai. They started the planning of the attacks nearly a 
year before the operation took place.217 Although Mumbai has experienced terror attacks 
and bombings in the past, the Indian government and police forces were not prepared for 
an attack of this magnitude. The complex and spectacular attack was dispersed over 
multiple locations.218 The local police forces were not trained and equipped to fight the 
terrorists. They had only prepared for regular bomb attacks, usually in one location. 
3. Aim of the Mission 
The strategic aim of the LeT attacks was to increase the tension between Pakistan 
and India. They wanted to shift Pakistan’s focus to the Kashmir region and possible 
conflict with India. This would result in less of Pakistan’s resources being diverted to 
support the U.S. effort on the Afghan border region. LeT wanted to reduce the pressure 
on the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaida in the Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA) 
in northwestern Pakistan.219 Another goal was to increase the numbers of new recruits for 
the cause. The tactical goal was to create terror in Mumbai, by killing as many citizens, 
law enforcement officers, and internationals, in the face of the international media.220 
4. Mission Execution 
The attacks on Mumbai were well planned; the recruitment and training of most 
of the attackers took over a year. During this period, they received lessons on the Quran 
and advanced training with focus on assault rifles, hand grenades, explosives, rocket 
launchers, and understanding India’s security agencies.221 One remarkable aspect of the 
training was a month-long, maritime-focused training. They were taught how to survive 
and operate in a maritime environment: swimming, navigation, and small boating skills. 
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Besides the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), few terrorist groups conduct 
specific training in maritime operations.222 Once the training was complete, ten members 
were selected to perform the attack on Mumbai. All the operatives were of Pakistani 
descent.  
LeT used open source intelligence like Google Earth to support the planning 
process. LeT members living in Mumbai scouted the landing site, routes to the target, and 
targets in Mumbai.223 The attack teams got their target packs together with all relevant 
information from the LeT leadership.224 The terrorists concluded that the safest way to 
travel from Pakistan to Mumbai with large amount of weapons and explosives was by 
sea.  
On November 21, 2008, the attack teams left India from Karachi on board a 
fishing trawler, merchant vessel (MV) al-Husseini.225 They blended in with the rest of 
the fishing trawlers and other ships on the busy shipping lanes, as they prepared 
themselves for a journey of 500 nautical miles that would take over 36 hours. In order to 
improve cover in India waters and close to Mumbai, the attack teams hijacked an Indian 
fishing trawler, the trawler, MV Kuber, out in the open sea.226 The terrorists killed the 
crew and forced the captain to navigate to Mumbai.  
Once the MV Kuber was a few miles out of the landing point, the captain was 
killed. The attack teams got off the trawler and into motorized rubber boats. This transfer, 
at night, at considerable sea-state with weapons and equipment, demonstrated that the 
maritime training had paid off. The attack teams, however, may have forgotten to sink the 
MV Kuber.227 The attack teams sailed with the motorized rubber boats, under the cover 
of darkness, towards the landing point.  
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The scouts selected a landing point that could be described as coastal slums, 
consisting of numerous shacks, fishing huts, and moored boats.228 Locals noticed the 
attack teams, but they never contacted the police, believing the terrorists were smugglers 
or students.  
The complete attack on Mumbai consisted of several diversion attacks, to confuse 
the local law enforcement and authorities. This drew the attention away from the main 
target. From the landing point, the teams split up, heading towards their targets. They 
used cabs or went by foot. The diversionary attacks took place at a popular café for 
tourists and the central railway station.229 In addition, to increase confusion, the cabs that 
were used contained bags of explosives with timed fuses.  
Once these diversionary attacks were conducted, the teams went towards the main 
objectives. These were Taj Mahal Hotel (two teams), Oberoi Trident Hotel (two teams), 
and a Jewish center at Nariman House (one team). The main attacks were synchronized 
and controlled by a LeT command center in Pakistan. They gave the attack teams specific 
instructions, mainly based on information they saw on the media (e.g., television and 
Twitter) that covered the attacks. Satellite phones, cell phones, and Voice Over Internet 
Protocol (VOIP) were used as communication between the attack teams and the 
command center.230  
The LeT commanders in Pakistan kept tight control of the overall attack. Media 
gave details on the whereabouts of a large group of citizens and of several ministers that 
were trapped in the Taj Mahal Hotel. News cameras also revealed the time it would take 
for the National Security Guard and Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) police unit to 
arrive.231 The LeT command center in Pakistan used this information to give the attack 
teams specific instructions to increase chaos and destruction They encouraged the 
terrorists in their attacks and reminded them to avoid capture by the police. 
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It took the Indians quite some time to react. After reaching an initial 
understanding of the extent of the attacks, the Indian authorities initiated the response. 
The National Security Guard, and later the Marine Commando (MARCO), a military 
counterterrorism unit, started to assault the three different locations. Regular Indian 
police units were not trained, armed, or equipped to face the heavily armed and well-
trained terrorists. However, in the morning of November 29, 2008, the Indian security 
forces had secured the city. They had killed nine of the ten terrorists and captured one. 
The terrorists had killed 172 people and injured 304 during their 60-hour attack.232 
5. Result of the Mission 
While tactically the mission was a success, the strategic goal of the terrorist 
mission was not met. The attack did increase the political tension between India and 
Pakistan, nor did it lead to a conventional conflict between India and Pakistan, which 
could have drawn the attention away from Pakistan’s CT efforts in the FATA. 
Additionally, it is hard to draw conclusions on the effects of the attacks on LeT 
recruitment. The attacks did result in a large increase in media attention for them, with 
more recruits the likely result. Tactically, the mission was a success; ten men caused 
havoc for three days in the financial capital of India. They caused multiple casualties and 
got extensive international media attention.  
6. Analysis of Principles 
a. Deliberate Planning 
The attacks were planned in great detail in advance. The maritime insertion was 
simple, but required detailed planning and specific maritime skills. These skills had to be 
taught and practiced. Crossing from the maritime domain to the land domain required 
small boat skills in a difficult environment in darkness and unforgiving sea-state. The fact 
that the leadership used a maritime insertion indicates that they thought this mission 
through. 
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The targets and the routes from the landing point were scouted by LeT members 
living in Mumbai. They had to know what to look for and transfer this information to 
LeT in Pakistan. This information must have been analyzed and subsequently turned into 
a plan of attack by the LeT leadership and the attackers. The attackers memorized the 
plan, routes, and instructions in detail: “Eyewitness accounts from the Taj Hotel indicate 
that the terrorists knew their way through hidden doors and back hallways of the hotel. 
According to another report, the terrorists had a detailed diagram of the hotel’s 
layout.”233 The operation scores very important (5/5) on the principle, which means it 
was critical for mission success.  
b. Tailored Force 
The detailed planned operation required a tailored force. The LeT organization 
made the decision to select only Pakistani members of LeT and not Indian members, who 
could have blended in better in their own country. The reason was that LeT leadership 
was afraid that India members would “chicken out” close to the attacks. The attacks were 
so indiscriminate that many fellow Muslims could be hurt or killed.234 Out of ten suitable 
candidates, only seven were selected, and another three battle-hardened members were 
added.235 The final ten members were hand-picked, based on their ethnic background, 
psychological profile, skill set, and previous experience. Out of the ten members, five 
equal assault teams were formed with one mission commander, Abu Dera Ismail 
Khan.236 
The total group size of ten was probably chosen due to limited space on board of 
the fishing trawler and rubber boats. They also wanted to avoid too much attention if 
stopped by security forces during the maritime insertion and the landing in Mumbai. 
Although the terrorists were on a suicide mission, they were the object of more selection, 
and received more training and equipment than normal terrorists or suicide bombers. The 
                                                 
233 Rabasa, Lessons of Mumbai, 3. 
234 Gunaratna, Mumbai Investigation, 145. 
235 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 53. 
236 Ibid., 53. 
 88 
operation scores very important (5/5) on the principle, which means it was critical for 
mission success. 
c. Specified Mobility 
One of the major success factors for the mission was a successful maritime 
insertion. For this, the attack teams chose to use several different platforms: two different 
fishing trawlers (one hijacked) and three rubber motorized boats. Once landed, the teams 
had no mobility assets of their own; some teams took a cab, and others walked to their 
targets. The use of the maritime insertion and different types of boats made the mission 
possible. Insertion by plane, road, or rail involved high risks of early detection by Indian 
authorities. The operation scores very important (5/5) on the principle, which means it 
was critical for mission success. 
d. Joint Support 
Terrorist organizations usually do not have a joint organization or structure. Two 
aspects in regards to joint support are specific to the Mumbai attacks. First, the attack 
teams did get support and guidance from their commanders in Pakistan. The commanders 
used media to provide detailed information on the ongoing attack. This simple, but 
effective, use of open source intelligence could be considered joint support, and also 
command and control.  
Secondly, the LeT planners of the attack exploited a weakness in the joint training 
and coordination of the Indian maritime security forces:  
The Indian Navy had discontinued joint coastal patrolling off the Mumbai 
coast after September 2005, and by 2008 neither the Navy nor the Coast 
Guard had practiced working together in joint operations. As a result, 
there was little understanding of the limits of their joint capabilities and 
coverage and the blind spots that standard operating procedures created.237 
By knowing and understanding the lack of coordination and capabilities of India’s 
maritime security services, the LeT leadership exploited India’s weakness when 
conducting maritime insertion: “Interoperability issues and confusion over maritime areas 
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of responsibility among the Indian Navy, Coast Guard, and coastal police forces made it 
possible for the teams to slip into the city unchallenged.”238 LeT exploited their lack of 
joint cooperation and demonstrated the importance of this principle in CT operations. The 
attack scores very important (5/5) on the principle, which means it was critical for 
mission success. 
e. Cover/Concealment 
Cover and concealment was especially important during the insertion phase, but 
also during the attack. The use of fishing vessels in an area where fishing is very common 
demonstrates the use of concealment. This was especially the case when the teams 
hijacked an Indian trawler, so they sailed unnoticed in Indian waters and close to the 
coast. From the debarkation off the fishing vessel, they used motorized rubber boats, 
which had a small footprint, especially while it was still dark. At the landing point, there 
were smaller boats beached, so here they blended in with their surroundings. Local 
citizen spotted the LeT teams after the landing, but they were not able to identify them. 
The attackers gave the impression they were smugglers or students, which were not 
uncommon in these areas.239 
The terrorists were dressed in a Western-style clothing not uncommon in 
Mumbai. Therefore, it was very difficult for the Indian security forces to stop the 
terrorists. The terrorist changed their clothes to ensured cover when moving between the 
targets.240 The Indian authorities did not know of the attack prior to the operation, hence 
it scores high on operational security. The operation scores very important (5/5) on the 
principle, which means it was critical for mission success. 
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f. Innovation  
The LeT innovated in several ways when planning and executing the attacks. 
They used the littorals to their advantage to insert the terrorists. LeT used information 
from open sources and Google Earth for their planning. The use of media coverage as a 
source of real-time open source intelligence was unique. This information meant the 
commanders in Pakistan could give the attack teams detailed instructions on common 
communications means: cell phones, satellite phones, and VOIP. The technology used in 
this attack was not new, but common and widely available. It was the way the terrorists 
used and combined it to their advantage that demonstrated doctrinal innovation. They 
also made five two-man teams, a creative way to ensure that multiple targets could be 
attacked at the same time, which is an excellent example of organizational innovation.241 
On the scale, the principle scores (4/5), which means that it was essential for achieving 
for mission success. 
7. Conclusion 
The Mumbai attack, from a terrorist point of view, would qualify as a special 
operation. Although the strategic goal was not met, on a tactical level, the mission was a 
success. All principles are considered to be very important, except the principle 
innovation; this one scores important on the scale. The reason for the high score on the 
five criteria is that, with a lesser score or effort by the terrorists, the mission would have 
had a very high chance of failure. Innovation was important, but not critical for the 
tactical success. With a lower score on innovation, the mission would probably still have 
been successful, but less effective without the intelligence from the LeT leadership. 
However, the use of the littorals remains crucial within the principle of innovation. This 
operation only had one principle that scored less than full score. Table 5 illustrates the 
scores for each principle. 
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Table 5.   Mumbai Terror Attack: Rating of Principles 
 
 
Figure 23 visualizes the principles in the radar figure. 
 
Figure 23.  Mumbai Terror Attack Analysis 
The hexagram is almost perfect, which makes it an excellent example of the significance 
of the principles for successful littoral special operations. It is also the only case were a 
non-state actor is analyzed using the principles. The high scores help build confidence in 
the importance of the principles across different types of Special Forces. 
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E. SOMALI PIRATE SHIP ATTACK: NLMARSOF (2011) 
This case was selected because underwater mobility played a crucial role in the 
mission. There are few similar missions conducted since WWII when Italian frogmen 
sabotaged allied ships.242 It is also one of the most current littoral special operations 
conducted.  
1. Background 
In 1991, ongoing civil war in Somalia brought down the government, which 
eventually turned it into a failed state. In South Somalia, the terror organization Al-
Shabaab gained more influence over the years. In North Somalia, a weak government 
was installed (Transitional Federal Government). Smaller states arose with some type of 
government control; Somaliland and Puntland are the most successful examples of this. 
Somalia has a coastline of over 1,500 nm—the longest in continental Africa—and 
had no government and certainly no effective coast guard. As a result, Somalia’s waters 
were frequently visited by foreign fishing vessels, which emptied the coastal waters of 
fish at a rapid rate. This often occurred without a permit, leaving the local fishermen with 
empty waters and no compensation. As a result of growing discontent by these fishermen, 
they started to seize foreign fishing vessels and demanded financial compensation for 
their loss of income. The companies who owned the vessels often paid this compensation 
quickly, which was practically a ransom. Somali fishermen and opportunists took notice 
of this. More “hijacks” of foreign fishing vessels occurred, but shifted eventually to large 
Merchant Vessels (MV) where sometimes valuable or sensitive cargo was hijacked.243 
Also, there were instances of sports and leisure yachts being hijacked and held 
hostage.244 Initially, the pirates operated around 200 nm off the Somali coast, with their 
twin-engine attack skiffs or slightly bigger whalers. Since 2008, the pirates extended their 
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range by making use of mother ships that had the attack skiffs onboard or towed 
behind.245 Figure 24 shows how the range of the pirates increased as they improved and 
innovated their methods: 
 
Figure 24.  Somali Coast and Range Circles246 
After successfully boarding the MV, the pirates would take control of the ship and 
force the crew to sail towards the Somali coast for anchorage, usually close to the pirates’ 
logistical home base. From this point on, the negations would start with the shipping 
companies for ransom for the crew, ship, and cargo. Often, the shipping companies 
would agree, after weeks and months of negotiations, to pay several millions of dollars 
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for the release of the ship and crew. This piracy business model was very attractive to 
many poor Somalia fishermen, which resulted in an increase of hijacked ships. 
The international community responded with counter-piracy (CP) operations 
supported by NATO, European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR), Combined Maritime 
Forces and Combined Task Force-151. Some countries sent ships under national 
command to safeguard their own specific national interests (i.e., China). The naval ships 
had the task to either escort and protect vulnerable ships, or disrupt the pirate activity at 
sea. One effective method of disrupting the pirates was to target their mother ships. While 
protection of the merchant shipping required a lot of assets, disrupting the pirates was 
difficult due to the large area of operation of the mother ships and the difficulty of 
identifying them. Figure 25 illustrates the size of the Area of Operations for the pirates 
compared to the size of Western Europe.  
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Despite these challenges, naval TFs reduced the number of successful attacks by 
pirates. However, the root cause of piracy was caused by the absence of an effective 
Somali government that could solve the problem on land. Unfortunately, neither the EU 
nor NATO approved CP operations on land in Somalia.  
Since 2009, the Royal Netherlands Navy had been deploying surface ships under 
EU and NATO command. The Netherlands has a large merchant fleet and substantial 
maritime interest. The Dutch minister of defense wanted to prioritize contributions to the 
protection of the shipping lanes in East Africa. Subsequently, the Royal Netherlands 
Navy deployed submarines to the coast of Somalia to gather intelligence on the activities 
of mother ships. Although the use of submarines was contributing to the fight against 
piracy, at the time, it was not considered enough by the minister of defense, and he 
requested further research on options to fight the pirates.  
At the same time, EUNAVFOR wanted to attack the pirates as closely as possible 
to the coastline—the center of the littorals. EUNAVFOR assessed that mother ships were 
the pirates’ most valued assets because the mother ships extended their range and made 
them blend in with regular fishermen. NL Maritime Special Operations Force 
(NLMARSOF) was requested by the Dutch Joint Special Operations (JSO) Branch to 
answer what they could contribute to target the mother ships. After an assessment on the 
threat (watch guards, use of radar, use of night vision goggles, and so on) and 
environment (water temperature, current, sea state, and shark threat), NLMARSOF stated 
that they could disable mother ships using frogmen to place explosive charges on the 
mother ships. JSO approved the mission. It was the first deployment of its kind for 
NLMARSOF, a trial for the use of maritime SOF in the fight against piracy, in a 
subsurface role.  
2. Aim of the Mission 
The aim of the mission for NLMARSOF was to disable pirate mother ships along 
the coast. By doing so, the pirates’ range of operation would be severely limited. The 
result would be safer shipping lanes for commercial use. There was one critical restriction 
during the mission; no pirates or hostages were to be injured or killed. Due to this, the 
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frogmen could not simply blow up the mother ship; they had to use surgical precision 
when employing limpets to terminate a mother ship’s sea worthiness. The deployment 
was scheduled to last six weeks.  
3. Mission Execution 
Since 2006, NLMARSOF had been focused on deployments outside the maritime 
environment, in the Afghan desert and mountains. When the antipiracy mission came up, 
the force had to refocus. Within a short time frame of months, they had to improve old 
skills and knowledge regarding diving, underwater demolition, and maritime maneuver. 
The platoon of frogmen developed new techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTP) for the 
specific mission along the coast of Somalia. These new TTPs had to be tested in an 
environment similar to Somalia. The Royal Dutch Navy has a naval base and marine 
barracks at the island of Curaçao, in the Caribbean. Although the conditions at Curaçao 
were not completely the same as in Somali waters, they were similar enough. After three 
weeks of intensive training and testing, the Special Operations Maritime Task Unit 
(SOMTU) had improved their diving skills, TTPs, and equipment well enough to 
proceed.  
The next phase before the deployment was training and integration with the ship 
used as a floating FOB. HMS Zuiderkruis (ZKRS) would be used for the counter-piracy 
operations. It was an old but sturdy supply ship, with a minimum of weapons, but had a 
Lynx helicopter on board to be used as a sniper platform. The focus of the integration 
was to practice the Command and Control structure and synchronize TTPs. Meetings 
achieved some of the integration, but the main effort took place during the transit from 
the Netherlands to Djibouti with the SOMTU on board. During this three-week transit, 
the SOMTU and the ZKRS finalized their critical integration training.  
In Djibouti, an exercise was held with the U.S. Personal Recovery Coordination 
Cell of Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). Shortly after 
Djibouti, a full dress rehearsal was held with all elements involved, SOMTU, ZKRS, 
Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell (PRCC), and Maritime Patrol Reconnaissance 
Aircrafts (MPRA), from Djibouti and Seychelles. 
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The first two weeks in theater were difficult. The SOMTU faced two major 
problems. The Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIB) were not reliable in the harsh 
conditions of a weakening monsoon. The satellite communication was not stable to 
guarantee communication between the RHIBs and the ZKRS. Both problems were 
critical to improve before conducting the mission. Due to these problems, the first two 
missions were canceled. After two weeks of hard work by the mechanics of the ZKRS 
and signalers of the SOMTU, the problems were finally resolved. This left the SOMTU 
with only three and a half weeks to perform their mission.  
Shortly after solving the technical problems, the SOMTU received orders to 
disable a small mother ship in South Somalia, in an Al-Shabaab–controlled area. The 
conditions were challenging: very shallow waters, confined maneuverability, limited 
entrance, limited exit routes, and changing currents. Two days were used to study maps 
and photographs, plan, and prepare the explosive charges. However, the actual execution 
of the mission took only a few hours. The frogmen were able to place an explosive 
charge and disable the mother ship without any collateral damage or hurting any pirates 
and hostages. After this success, three more missions were executed in a short space of 
time. All four missions had their own characteristics, but each took place in the heart of 
the littorals: changing currents, strong surf, full moonlight, a dozen hostages on board, or 
located in the center of a pirate anchorage with multiple hijacked ships. The missions 
conducted during full moon required additional underwater mobility: a two-person 
underwater delivery vehicle. 
Figure 26 illustrates the effect of a surgical sabotage mission. The explosives 
placed by the frogmen, destroyed the rudder and propeller of the dhow which resulted in 
the beaching of the dhow. 
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Figure 26.  Stranded Iranian Dhow with 20 Hostages, after a Sabotage Mission 
without Collateral Damage or Persons Hurt248 
At the end of the six-week deployment at sea, there were no more mother ships 
present at the coastline of Somalia. As planned, the ZKRS set sail to Kenya where the 
SOMTU disembarked. 
4. Result of the Mission 
The deployment resulted in the loss of four pirate mother ships previously used 
for supporting hijackings of MVs. The pirates were not able to repair or replace these 
valuable assets. The use of maritime SOF, especially frogmen, in combination with the 
presence of naval TFs resulted in a tremendous drop in successful hijacks by pirates. The 
numbers went from 176 attacks by suspected pirates in 2011, to 35 total attacks in 
2012.249 
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5. Analysis of Principles 
a. Deliberate Planning 
Although most frogmen were trained in conducting ship attacks in a harbor, this 
mission was conducted in a completely different environment. The changing and 
unknown environmental conditions required research and additional extensive training. 
During the pre-deployment training, all procedures were tested and rehearsed with all 
units involved. In theater, a last full dress rehearsal was conducted. However, some 
problems were detected only in the exact environment and place of the actual mission; a 
strong monsoon created heavy sea state, which caused problems with communication and 
mobility. Once these technical problems were resolved, the missions went without any 
problems. Before each separate mission, it was not possible to rehearse since there were 
no practice targets available, and time was extremely limited. However, before the 
mission planning started, intelligence from MPRAs and other sensors was available so 
that a detailed planning was possible. On the scale, the principle scores (4/5), which 
means that it was essential for achieving for mission success. 
b. Tailored Force 
The SOMTU was specifically organized to perform the required tasks for the 
mission. It was an effort to keep the teams organic, and to maintain unit cohesion, but 
some changes were required. An additional sniper team was created to support the 
mission from the helicopter. The staff element of the SOMTU needed to perform several 
core staff functions like intelligence, operations, and communications. The ZKRS limited 
the size of the staff element because of limited space on board, especially in the 
command center. In addition, the staff had to be as lean as possible, which resulted in 
limitations to the frequency and the duration of the missions that could be performed. The 
operation scores very important (5/5) on the principle, which means it was critical for 
mission success. 
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c. Specified Mobility 
To conduct subsurface sabotage missions, frogmen were required. In this mission, 
surface attacks were possible, but they would have increased the risks to the SOMTU and 
the hostages. Mostly, the frogmen were relying on their own propulsion (fins). However, 
due to changing environmental conditions, additional assets were required to conduct a 
specific mission. For that mission, the frogmen used an underwater propulsion device to 
increase their reach.  
The RHIBs were normally used by the navy for logistical runs between ship to 
ship or ship to shore. However, they were not suitable as a SOF platform under harsh 
environmental conditions. Ideally, more robust RHIBs with additional sensors and 
weapons would have increased success of the deployment from the beginning. In the 
following year (2012), more specified mobility deployment was used, like jet skis and the 
use of submarines by frogmen. Also, RHIBs specifically for maritime SOF missions were 
implemented. The operation scores very important (5/5) on the principle, which means it 
was critical for mission success. 
d. Joint Support 
The deployment was run by the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps and Navy, but 
was also supported by assets from the air force, MPRAs and Para Jumpers of the PRCC. 
The MPRAs were used to gather critical information for the targeting process and 
surveillance during the mission itself. Without this joint support, the targeting process 
would have been very difficult, if not impossible. During the execution of the mission, 
the MPRAs provided information that reduced the overall risk to the mission. Although 
the mission was mainly self-supported by the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps and Navy, 
a small but crucial support was provided by assets of the Air Force. The operation scores 




The ZKRS was a difficult ship to hide in the littorals due to her size. Therefore, 
she kept her distance from the target, and stayed outside radar range. Helicopters 
accomplished the reconnaissance. Because many naval TFs were also conducting flights 
by helicopter, the reconnaissance flights did not draw extra attention. Initially, the 
SOMTU used only the hours of total darkness in the evenings for operations. In a later 
stage, specified underwater mobility was used to stay completely undetected even during 
full moonlight conditions. The frogmen made use of cover and concealment in a high 
degree; they stayed mostly underwater and only surfaced to check navigation. The 
Somali pirates did not expect ship attacks on their mother ships, and the operation scores 
high on security. The operation scores very important (5/5) on the principle, which means 
it was critical for mission success. 
f. Innovation  
It was the Minister of Defense who pushed for innovation in the fight against 
piracy in Somalia—first surface ships, then submarines, and later maritime SOF. It is fair 
to state that the innovation of this deployment was more organizational and doctrinal than 
technical. The deployment was conducted by using relatively basic technology; some had 
existed since WWII. However, some technology was state of the art and was used to 
improve the navigational capabilities of the frogmen, as well as their communication 
means for recovery purposes. On the scale, the principle scores (4/5), which means that it 
was essential for achieving for mission success. 
6. Conclusion  
The first deployment was a trial, with limited expectations. After overcoming 
technical problems (satellite communication and RHIB problems), it became possible to 
execute the missions in a challenging littoral environment. The deliberate planning, joint 
support, and cover/concealment, made the mission possible. From Table 6, one can see 
that the operation scores high on all the principles:  
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Table 6.   Somalia Ship Attack: Rating of Principles 
 
 
The operation analysis gave four principles on very important and two on 
important, which helps validate the principles as important for littoral special operations. 
The deployment resulted in a devastating loss of the pirates’ most valued asset: the 
mother ships. By doing so, the frogmen contributed to the disruption of their lucrative 
business model. Figure 27 visualizes the score of the principles in the radar figure. 
 
Figure 27.  Somalia Ship Attack Analysis 
The hexagram is almost perfect, except for deliberate planning and innovation, 
both of which score four out of five. After 2011, the number of pirated ships decreased 
significantly. Nearly 70 years later, after the success of Italian and British frogmen in 
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WWII, a dozen frogmen again demonstrated, in the waters off Somalia, that they could 
still make a difference. This operation is an excellent example of the significance of the 












IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this chapter, the cases are compared to demonstrate which principles are the 
most important for conducting littoral special operations.  Thereafter, the futuristic 
scenario introduced in Chapter I is further developed and then analyzed using the littoral 
special operations principles.  The chapter concludes with a summary and 
recommendations for future research. 
A. COMPARISON OF ALL HISTORICAL CASES AGAINST PRINCIPLES   
Table 7 shows the relative importance of each principle with a cross-case 
comparison.   
Table 7.   All Cases Rated against Principles (1–5) 
 
 
Based on the cases presented, each score is considered important to successfully 
plan and execute a littoral special operation as each has an average score of 4.3 or higher.  
Using a percentage rating as well, the principles can be further compared against each 
other in Figure 28.  
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Figure 28.  Percentage Score for Principles  
The most important principles for littoral special operations, with the highest 
score of 96 percent, are joint support and tailored force. In second place is specified 
mobility. Then cover and concealment is in third place. Deliberate planning and 
innovation share a fourth place, both scoring 84 percent. It may be that these last three 
principles are important for all types of operations, but not specifically as important as 
the other principles for littoral special operations. Figure 29 shows a comparison of all 
the principles in a radar figure. 
 107 
 
Figure 29.  All Cases Rated with Principles 
Across all the cases, each principle generally scored high on the 1-5 rating scale 
meaning that as defined each principle was at a minimum essential to consider for 
mission success.  The raid on Chatham scored relatively low on cover and concealment, 
but scored high on most of the other principles. Cover and concealment is considered to 
be an outlier, since it pulls the average score significantly down for this principle. Cover 
and concealment like it is applied today, was apparently less relevant at the time of the 
raid on Chatham. Probably, de Ruyter was less concerned with this principle since 
communication of the British, after being compromised, went by foot, horseback, or 
perhaps by smoke signals. This meant that the British had little time to make preparations 
for the raid. The raid on Chatham was also the operation with the least SOF-like force 
structure since it was inserted using a superior Dutch fleet to target the objectives. If the 
score of cover and concealment was left out for the raid on Chatham, it would have 
become the most important principle of all. Since this was the only operation were the 
offensive force was not at a sizable disadvantage, the principle was less relevant to the 
success of the operation. 
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On the Pebble Island raid, there are two principles with a moderate score: 
deliberate planning and innovation. The operation was planned and executed in a few 
days to ensure the main landing in San Carlos could happen as planned. Initially the SAS 
planners asked for a three-week planning and preparation period for the big raid. 
However, Admiral Woodward, the commander of the entire British Task Force, pushed 
to keep the original landing date. The SAS planners had their SR team deploy within 48 
hours of the initial warning order. The raid happened just 48 hours after that, which 
means that the time for deliberate planning and innovations was limited. Although there 
were a few injuries and some mistakes, the overall mission was a success, and the main 
landing could happen as planned.  
The average score for all the principles is included in Figure 29 as the orange 
color, and is almost a perfect hexagram. That indicates that the principles are important 
for all the cases in which they were tested. The analysis of the case studies clearly shows 
that the principles are important for littoral special operations. It makes sense that any 
special operation would benefit from support from the other services, especially in the 
littoral domain where all services can influence the fight. Littoral special operations are 
with high risks and place the unit at an extreme disadvantage; as such, a small, fragile 
force must rely on others and guile to make the mission succeed. 
B. TRIPOLI HOSTAGE RESCUE: OPERATION ORCA 2024 
This operation was developed to create a realistic scenario occurring in the future 
to stress the importance of the principles. The scenario incorporates new types of 
weaponry and tactics, to show the use of the principles in a futuristic urban littoral 
scenario.250 The security situation in Libya has been degrading for several years and it 
may become a failed state. IS in Libya is currently gaining ground, and the close 
proximity to European borders makes it plausible for future attacks to originate from this 
area. French forces were chosen for the scenario because they have capable maritime 
SOF and a government willing to act on direct provocations. This scenario concludes 
                                                 
250 The concept of this futuristic scenario is similar to “The war of19-,” a chapter in Command of the 
Air by Giulio Douhet, where he describes his concept of future air power.  The air forces he imagined did 
not exist when he wrote his book in 1931. 
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with an analysis, demonstrating how each principle impacted the operation positively. 
Although the scenario occurs in the future, it is written as if it already had happened. 
1. Background 
The background for this scenario was initially presented in Chapter I. Libya 
became a failed state in which IS Libya was able to grow in strength. IS Libya was 
responsible for a terrorist attack at the European soccer championship between France 
and Britain. IS Libya had SAMs and swarming patrol boats to protect themselves from 
any outside threat. 
Figure 30 shows the main factions and their respective land areas. Elements of the 
jihadist factions had pledged alliance with IS and took control of the coastal city Sirte.251 
IS Libya expanded rapidly as Russia and Western powers attacked IS in Syria and 
Iraq.252 
                                                 
251 Nick Robins-Early, “What We Know About ISIS in Libya,” Huffington Post, February 19, 2016, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/IS-presence-in-libya_us_56b369e2e4b08069c7a6352f. 
252 Sciutto, Starr, and Liptak, “ISIS Fighters in Libya Surge.” 
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Figure 30.  Map of Groups in the Libyan Civil War in 2014253 
2. Aim of the Mission 
The French Commandos Marine, Counter Terrorist section, was tasked to conduct 
a leadership targeting operation in Tripoli to avenge the attacks. The British Special Boat 
Service (SBS) conducted a similar operation simultaneously. The French commandos 
attempted to capture Mohammad Al-Yemini, the Yemeni national, believed to lead the IS 
council in Tripoli. The SBS targeted the second in command, Abu Nabil Hussein.254 
Both targets were believed to hold residence in Tripoli. The operation was intended to 
hamper IS’s ability to lead its groups, potentially resulting in a leadership quarrel within 
IS Libya. The operation would also be a huge public victory for the French and British 
governments after the horrific attack on their national teams during the European 
                                                 
253 Staff, “Libya Civil War: That It Should Come to This,” Economist, January 10, 2015, 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21638123-four-year-descent-arab-spring-factional-chaos-it-
should-come. 
254 Both persons are fictional. 
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championships in Germany. This futuristic scenario focuses on the French part of the 
operation.  
3. Mission Execution 
Due to limited presence in Libya over the last five years, French intelligence was 
sparse about IS leadership and its capabilities. Through bilateral support from the United 
States, the French were informed about the location of the main compound of Al-Yemini. 
However, limited intelligence was available on the protection of the compound or the 
disposition of IS troops in the area. Initially, French higher command had discussed an air 
strike on the compound, but the French government did not want to risk any excessive 
collateral damage in the city. They primarily wanted the IS leader captured, and killed 
only if capture was not possible.  
The planning team decided early to insert an SR team to provide firsthand 
intelligence on the current situation. The small four-man SR team would report back to 
provide the necessary details for the assault group to plan and execute the high risk 
capture. The French decided for a small group, so they could move around in Tripoli with 
a small footprint. The surface-to-air threat made any air insertion or extraction on land 
difficult. Figure 31 illustrates the challenging terrain of the mission. 
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Figure 31.  Tripoli Harbor255 
The SR and assault teams built a mock-up version of the IS compound and 
conducted several rehearsals. They conducted large-scale insertion rehearsals with 
submarines and airplanes that would support the operation. They also met with their 
British counterparts, the SBS, to exchange ideas and tactics. The SBS also functioned as 
a so-called red cell. The SBS would conduct a similar raid the same night.  
Due to the threat from the IS navy, which was organized based on swarming 
tactics, the insertion of the SR team was below the water (subsurface). The SR team was 
inserted by a French submarine off the coast of Libya. The operators left the submarine 
while submerged and infiltrated with diving equipment together with the innovative 
personal underwater propulsion fins. The new stealthy propulsion fins could help them 
move eight knots for three hours, covering up to 24 nm. A local agent linked up with 
them at a preplanned position. The combat divers were picked up by his fishing boat and 
transported to one of the small harbors in the suburbs of Tripoli.  
The agent introduced the SR team to his compatriots in a local resistance group. 
The resistance fighters transported the SR team in local vehicles to an apartment close to 
                                                 
255 “Tripoli Harbor,” Cecili Images, accessed April 7, 2016, 
http://cecilimages.photoshelter.com/image/I00005yvPtINgAQE. 
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the IS compound. The apartment provided over-watch on the compound and would 
provide sniper cover during the operation. The main assault group was inserted by a 
French transport airplane from the mainland and dropped the assaulters by parachutes 
with submergible RHIBs off the coast of Tripoli, two days after the SR team was 
inserted.  
The assault force made use of the cover of darkness and the submergible stealth 
RHIBs to reach the friendly harbor building unnoticed. They linked up with the local 
resistance and spent the day in hiding. At dusk the following night, they linked up with 
the advance party and infiltrated with local cars, close to the target building. They 
dismounted the cars a few blocks away and went by foot into the target compound and 
conducted the assault.  
The primary goal was to capture Al-Yemini or eliminate him if the resistance was 
too fierce. The assaulters would try to extract as much information as possible from the 
compound. The local resistance groups would attack several other IS compounds in the 
city at the same time to divert the IS forces.  
The assault was initiated when the sniper over-watch eliminated the threat of the 
main guards, using non-lethal weapons. The command group would secure the building 
from outside the compound. The assaulters climbed the compound wall and divided into 
three groups. One group entered the building at the main door, one entered the back door, 
and the third group entered the guard building.  
At the compound, everyone was asleep. The other guards and the family members 
were taken by surprise and handcuffed and blindfolded. The assaulters collected all found 
documents and digital storage devices. The target was cleared and searched in less than 
15 minutes. The prisoner was brought out the main gate while the assaulters dragged the 
unconscious main guards inside the compound to avoid any attention. The assaulters all 
infiltrated the harbor in civilian cars and thanked the locals for their help. The boat 
drivers brought their submergible RHIBs to the water’s surface and started the extraction 
to the preplanned submarine link-up location. After the link up with the submarine and 
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the French Commando Marines, all left the coast of Libya with their main objective being 
captured. The mission was a great success.  
4. Result of the Mission 
Both the French and British operations were successful. The French arrested the 
IS leader, and the British SBS managed to eliminate the second-in-command. By 
removing the leaders, internal fights for power within IS Libya broke out. This internal 
struggle enabled the rise of a new wave of resistance against IS Libya. It was also a 
success for the French and British governments, as it demonstrated that the classic 
superpowers were still able to influence world affairs, and if necessary, would respond to 
direct provocations with force. 
5. Analysis of How the Principles Influenced the Mission 
a. Deliberate Planning 
The operation was well planned and rehearsed before the execution. This helped 
to ensure that the operation was executed without any significant mishaps. The planners 
were able to look at the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy and utilize those to 
successfully conduct the operation. The surface-to-air capability of IS, combined with 
their swarm-capable navy, made the IS leadership feel safe from targeting operations in 
the city of Tripoli. The IS leadership knew that an airstrike in a highly populated city was 
very unlikely. The use of local resistance and an SR team in advance helped the assault 
force get the information and support they needed on the ground. Submarines, submerged 
RHIBs, and propulsive fins helped the force avoid the threat from the IS navy. Deliberate 
planning contributed on a large scale to the mission success. 
b. Tailored Force 
Since the force was entering enemy territory and was using local assets for 
transportation, the SR team leader and the assault team leader had to cut the force size to 
the absolute minimum. The submergible RHIBs can only take eight operators each. A 
submarine would pick them up after the attack, which again limited the size of the group. 
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The small footprint also made it easier to move around with local forces in Tripoli. In that 
sense, the force was tailored to the exact need of the operation. 
c. Specified Mobility 
The force used a submarine for both insertion and extraction. They used airdrop 
and diving equipment. They also had self-propelled fins and submergible RHIBs: both 
products were built with the latest technology and were unique on the market. The force 
combined the best equipment that a technology-advanced military can offer, with local 
assets such as fishing boats and vehicles to blend in. The mobility was highly specified in 
order to reach the compound and to extract everyone safely back to France after the 
mission. 
d. Joint Support 
The operation received support from the French Navy and Air Force, allies, and 
locals in Tripoli. The mission could simply not have been completed without joint and 
combined support. 
e. Cover/Concealment 
Throughout the mission, cover and concealment were key to successfully 
capturing the IS leader. If the SR team or the assault force had been spotted, during 
insertion or observing the target, the mission would have been a failure. When including 
local forces in an operation like this, there is always a risk that the operation might be 
leaked to the enemy. In this scenario, the local resistance was trustworthy. They certainly 
had the same interest as the French forces. The use of the new submergible RHIBs made 
it possible for the assault force to enter the harbor unseen by the IS navy, avoiding any 
swarm attacks. The operation was carried out without the enemy’s prior knowledge, 
which implies the security was good. 
f. Innovation  
The planners had to be very creative to achieve the necessary surprise for this 
mission. The surface-to-air threat combined with the smart naval defense of IS made 
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cover and concealment a very important principle for success. The French force 
combined military tactics with local support to achieve the insertion and extraction 
without exposing the force to IS. This would not have been possible without the 
innovative use of different types of insertion methods and creative use of tactics once on 
the ground. The mission was very much dependent on the innovative use of different 
techniques. 
6. Conclusion  
The principles were important to succeed with this complex operation. Cover and 
concealment stands out prominently as a key principle and was very dependent on the 
other principles to be successful. Any exposure to the enemy prior to the actual assault 
would probably have led to the cancellation of the whole operation. The clever use of the 
maritime SOF unit allowed the French government to arrest and prosecute the IS leader 
without any collateral damage to innocent Libyan civilians. This futuristic scenario helps 
to illustrate how important these principles may be when maritime SOF conducts 
operations in the urban littoral environment in the future.  
C. SUMMARY 
World trends highlight the importance of the littorals as a future environment for 
conflicts. The littorals are more complex than other domains, since they are in the 
intersection of all of them. Special forces are arguably the force of choice for complex 
missions in the littorals; maritime special forces are preferred since they possess the 
capability to exceed in and cross all the domains effectively. Littoral special operations 
are more complex than other types of special operations because of the subdomains and 
the interrelationship with the other domains.  
Since 2001, SOF has become more land-focused due to 15 years of fighting in 
landlocked environments. As future conflicts are more likely to happen in the littorals, a 
shift in focus for maritime SOF is a logical decision enabling SOF to prepare for the 
future fight instead of the last type of conflict fought. The analysis of five historical cases 
supports the significance of the six key principles identified for success in littoral special 
operations. The cases were chosen to provide variety in time period, geography, mission 
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type, and force. The futuristic scenario illuminates the principles in a likely future 
conflict. Terrorists are aware of the complexity of the littorals as well; they have 
exploited and will exploit gaps left by governments and state organizations, as is shown 
by the LeT attacks on Mumbai.  
The principles showed significance across the operations analyzed. Therefore, the 
principles are relevant and should become part of any future concepts or doctrine to set 
SOF up for success in the littorals.  
D. RECOMMENDATIONS  
1. Doctrinal 
SOF should consider the six principles when training, planning, and executing 
missions in the littorals. In order to formalize the importance of the principles, it is also 
recommended that these principles be incorporated into any future concept or doctrine for 
special operations in the littorals. If the UN trends and Kilcullen’s insight become reality, 
the principles will be important for maritime SOF to consider in meeting the challenges 
of the future. 
2. Future Research 
Future studies regarding littoral special operations should consider testing these 
principles on more historical examples. This study selected operations with variety in 
time, geography, force, and execution, but the more examples in which the principles can 
be evaluated, the better it is for validating or disproving them. It would also be interesting 
to see how cover and concealment would fare in other cases, as the raid on Chatham had 
a strong influence on the final score. More case studies would help resolve this question.  
Additionally, an even more detailed analysis of each case study could also help to 
validate the principles. This research was limited to only secondary sources. Primary 
source research to include interviews and possible site surveys of actual location are 
methods that would help to improve the overall richness of the analysis and further 
validate the principles.  
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Third, the existing six principles were developed by incorporating the most 
important principles derived from the literature review. There may, however, be other 
principles out there that are equally or more important than the ones found here. Now 
moving on to the. 
In regards to the methodological framework, the five-point Likert scale was used 
to represent how relevant a principle was. The findings showed that many of the scores of 
for each principles are very close together therefore the use of a scale with more 
variability could result in a more precise measure of each principle. This could lead to 
more insight. This is also useful to disaggregate the three most important and relevant 
principles, joint support, specified mobility, and tailored force. Since they all had high 
scores, it is plausible that these three principles are not only foundational ones but also 
are dependent on each other to achieve operational success.  A scale that offers more 
precision could then help explain which principles are the most critical to littoral special 
operations.   
Second, this limited research demonstrates the importance of the six principles. 
Another effective method to validate or disprove research is falsification, used in science 
and the intelligence community. It would help validate the principles if it was not 
possible to find littoral special operations that were successful without the use of the 
principles, or those that followed the principles and still failed. Another approach is to 
analyze unsuccessful littoral special operations, and see whether they scored high on 
these principles.  
Last, future studies may develop an overarching theory for littoral special 
operations where these principles, and perhaps others, help the littoral SOF to achieve an 
advantage over the enemy. The principles may be equally important for conventional 
littoral operations or for other types of special operations. One might extend on the theory 
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